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Abstract 
 
This research explored the use of modeling and enterprise architecture in the 
analysis of Air Force Capabilities.  The Air Force accomplishes this through the 
Capability Review and Risk Assessment (CRRA).  The CRRA is currently performed by 
building architectures which contain Process Sequence Models (PSMs).  PSMs are scored 
by Subject Matter Experts to determine the probability of successfully completing the 
mission they model and ultimately to determine the risk associated to Air Force 
capabilities.  Two findings were identified.  The first is that creating additional 
architectural viewpoints, some of which are currently being proposed for version 2.0 of 
the DoD Architecture Framework, can benefit CRRA development.  The second is PSMs 
have fundamental limitations associated with the inability to capture dependencies among 
activities as well as the inability to get beyond binary success criteria to address issues of 
capability sufficiency.  To remedy these limitations a model called Extended Sequence 
Models (ESMs) was developed.  ESMs extend PSMs by using reliability modeling 
techniques combined with linear regression to show dependencies between components.  
This model also allows the effects of capability sufficiency to be captured and related to 
mission success. 
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APPLICATION OF RELIABILITY AND LINEAR REGRESSION TO ENTERPRISE 
ARCHITECTURE IN SUPPORT OF THE US AIR FORCE’S CAPABILITY REVIEW 
AND RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In 2003 the Department of Defense (DoD) changed the method it uses to define 
operational needs by transitioning from the Requirements Generation System to the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).  This change was captured in 
the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01 series.  The DoD 
Joint Staff described this change as one from a service-focused, threat-based analysis to 
one that is Joint-focused and Capability-based (JCS, 2005:6).  Capability, as used in this 
research, is “the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and 
conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks” as defined 
in the CJCSI 3170.01F (JCIDS).  JCIDS is a key supporting process to the DoD 
Acquisition, Programming, and Budgeting processes.  JCIDS includes three main 
analyses: identify the capabilities needed to perform required missions (Functional Area 
Analysis, or FAA), evaluate the current force’s ability to meet those capabilities 
(Functional Needs Analysis, or FNA), and identify possible solutions to eliminate any 
capability shortfalls (Functional Solutions Analysis, or FSA).  In the language often used 
within the DoD, the purpose of this process is to “fill the capability gap” (CJCS, 
2007:A5).  The Air Force accomplishes these analyses for the capabilities it is expected 
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to deliver to the joint force with Called Capability Based Planning (CBP) as described in 
Air Force Instructions (AFI) 10-601 Capability Based Requirement Development and 
AFI 10-604 Capability Based Planning.  Within this larger planning method, the Air 
Force uses a sub-process to identify its needed capabilities and determine its ability to 
deliver those capabilities, the first two analyses of the JCIDS process.  The Air Force 
accomplishes this through a risk analysis method called the Capabilities Review and Risk 
Assessment (CRRA) (DAF, 2006: 6).  Additionally, the analytic models used to 
accomplish the CRRA are Process Sequence Models (PSMs). 
Years before the DoD made its transition to capability based planning, many in 
the federal government recognized a need to better document the architecture of the 
systems that were developed and used.  In this use, architecture is “the structure of 
components, their relationships, and the principles and guidelines governing their design 
and evolution over time” (DoD, 2007: ES-1).  This realization rose from the information 
technology community’s efforts to ensure system interoperability.  Benefits of building 
system architectures were deemed important enough that statutory requirements were 
developed to mandate their construction in various situations.  A few examples of these 
requirements are the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, Office of Management and Budget 
Circular A-130, the E-Government Act of 2002 (DoD, 2007: 3-2); and even JCIDS.  
Over the course of the last 15 years, there has been a growing appreciation for the 
benefits of documenting the architecture of various types of systems such as 
manufacturing systems, social systems, and political systems to name a few (Maier and 
Rechtin, 2002). 
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1.1 Research Questions 
This research answers several questions.  The first is, ‘How is architecture 
currently being used to support the CRRA?’  Included is an examination of PSMs to 
include their assumptions and limitations.  The second question is, ‘How can the current 
architectural models be extended to make them more appropriate and useful?’  The third 
question is, ‘What other architectural models can be built and analyzed that would assist 
the CRRA?’ 
Since the CRRA is a sub-process of the larger CBP process the boundaries 
between the two can be somewhat ambiguous.  This study considers the CRRA to 
encompass the activities needed to identify Air Force capability shortfalls, gaps, and trade 
space as described in AFI 10-604.  For the purpose of this study it does not include the 
supporting processes of developing and writing Air Force Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) which are covered in Air Force Policy Document (AFPD) 10-28, the 
development of the Master Capability Library (MCL) or Joint Capability Areas (JCAs), 
or the follow-on process of determining appropriate solutions to fill the capability gaps 
(DAF, 2005:5).  A further discussion of the CRRA is presented in Chapter 2.  
1.2  Implications 
Developing architecture models to evaluate a complex system can lead to a better 
understanding of the system and its behavior.  However, not all models are equally useful 
or even appropriate.  This research aims to equip the CRRA practitioner with techniques 
to improve the CRRA methodology.  Identifying ways the current modeling techniques 
can be extended while suggesting other architectural models not currently used will lead 
to a more complete picture of Air Force capability performance.  It will result in a more 
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accurate analysis of current capabilities while at the same time making the method more 
defendable to those questioning its results.  As the method improves, the Air Force will 
increase its ability to ensure it is equipped, organized, and trained to deliver the necessary 
capabilities to the Joint force.  
1.3 Thesis Overview 
With the research questions framed, the next chapter will provide a more detailed 
background of the CRRA, architecture, and the PSMs currently used to support the 
CRRA.  Chapter 3 will explain the methodology that was used to answer the research 
questions.  Chapter 4 will present and explain the results of the study.  Finally, the 
conclusions and recommendations will be presented along with areas for further research 
in Chapter 5. 
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2. Background 
 
In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, a new strategy was presented to 
determine requirements for future military systems or organizational changes using a 
Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) approach (DoD, 2001:17).  Shortly thereafter, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who himself had grown dissatisfied with the 
DoD’s Requirements Generation System, sent the below memo to General Peter Pace, 
who was dual-hatted as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chairman of the 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) (JCS, 2006:5). 
 
This memo led to an extensive redesign of the methods the DoD uses to determine 
future capabilities.  In fact, it was decided the word ‘requirements’ would not even be 
used, in favor of the word ‘capability’.  It was out of this work that the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was born and began implementation by the 
following summer of 2003 (JCS, 2006:5).  The JCIDS process was created to support the 
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JROC requirement to validate and prioritize joint warfighting requirements (CJCS, 
2007:2).  By implementing a Capability-Based approach the JCIDS process has 
integrated joint concepts and integrated architecture into the Doctrine, Organization, 
Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) 
analysis methodology (CJCS, 2007:A-1).  It attempts to achieve this by leveraging the 
experience of many agencies to identify improvements to existing capabilities as well as 
introduce new capabilities. 
Another reason for the development of a Capabilities-Based approach was the 
acknowledgement that the United States could no longer know what nation, group of 
nations or non-state actor would pose a threat to the United States, its interests or allies.  
From this point forward, the United States was forced to try to anticipate adversarial 
capabilities and prepare an adequate response to those threats.  In contrast to a 
Requirements Generation System, a Capabilities-Based model focuses on how a range of 
adversaries might fight while looking at various contingency locations as opposed to one 
static threat.  It relies on determining what capabilities the armed forces need, to either 
deter or defeat its adversaries (DoD, 2001:IV).  
The following simplified illustration displays the change in concept from the old 
Requirements Generation System to the revised Capability-Based approach (Figure 2.1).  
On the left side of the picture is the old “stove-piped” version, where services 
individually generated their system requirements from scenarios they envisioned as 
service-focused missions, rarely assuming any capability integration with the other 
services.  It wasn’t until the end of the process that an attempt was made to integrate 
multi-force capabilities, taking a massive amount of effort from the joint community.   
 Figure 2.1 Capability
This differs dramatically from the right side of the illustration where capabilities 
are conceptualized in a “born joint” top
identified from scenarios derived from
From concept down through the analysis, the assumption is that all oper
joint operations.  In his paper
capabilities have jointness built in; they start that
2004:7).  During the analysis, capability 
must be fulfilled to complete the mission.  This does not mean that the individual services 
no longer have to determine their own requirements; in contrast, “service participat
critical to developing joint perspectives throughout the process” 
Capability Based Assessments are 
businesses also take advantage of
a success, is Wal-Mart Corporation.  In a paper by Col Stephen Walker on Capabilities
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-Based approach (Jacques, 2006:4) 
-down approach.  Here, needed capabili
 missions based on joint operational concepts.  
ations will be 
, Bob Larsen commented that “The resulting warfighting 
 way and they finish that way”
needs are derived to determine what obligations 
(Larsen, 2004
not unique to the military; many commercial 
 this concept.  One instance of this, often pointed o
 
ties are 
 (Larsen, 
ion is 
:7).   
ut as 
-
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Based planning, the differences in methodology between Wal-Mart and K-Mart are 
discussed, ultimately leading to the conclusion that a Capabilities-Based approach is a 
factor (at least in part) to Wal-Mart’s rise from an unknown entity in the late 1970s to a 
world marketing leader at the present time (Walker, 2005:5). 
2.1 Implementing JCIDS with the CRRA 
To implement JCIDS, the Air Force created their own Capabilities-Based 
Planning (CBP) process.  The Air Force CBA is based on an existing Joint Operating 
Concept (JOC), Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) or Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  Its 
purpose is to identify the capabilities required to execute missions, the shortfalls in 
existing weapon systems, and possible “trade space” where resources can be taken from 
areas where capabilities are comfortably being met and applied to areas with capability 
deficiencies.  The CBA is scoped by six elements: Capabilities desired, Scenarios 
considered, Functions considered, Types of solutions considered, Resource limits, and 
Planning horizon (JCS, 2006:22).  A sub-process to CBP is the Capability Review and 
Risk Assessment (CRRA).  The CRRA was initiated by the Chief of Staff of the United 
States Air Force (CSAF) to facilitate the development of an operationally focused 
Capabilities analysis.  During the 2002 Commander’s Conference, the CSAF outlined his 
sight picture: 
 The bottom-line goal for the CRRA is to give senior USAF leadership an 
operational, capabilities-based focus for acquisition program decision-
making.…To accomplish this requires reviewing acquisition programs and 
discussing disconnects and prioritization in relation to how the programs 
support CONOPS capabilities. The focus shifts from program review to a 
review of how our programs contribute to the warfighting capability. The 
CRRA will seek to evaluate the health and risk of required CONOPS 
capabilities over the next 20 years.   (HQ USAF, 2007:2) 
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Originally developed in 2003, and published biennially thereafter, the CRRA’s 
purpose is to analyze the capabilities within each of the seven Air Force CONOPS which 
are: 
• Global Strike 
• Homeland Security 
• Global Mobility 
• Global Persistent Attack 
• Nuclear Response 
• Space & C4ISR 
• Agile Combat Support 
The CRRA has become more robust with each iteration.  It is used to analyze capabilities 
against specifically developed joint scenarios, thus assuring current and future 
capabilities requirements and shortfalls are addressed with respect to scenarios of interest 
to the joint force.  The CRRA is accomplished with respect to three timeframes to 
evaluate current capability performance as well as expected future capability performance 
(HQ USAF, 2008a: 24).  The CONOPS Champions at Headquarters Air Force’s office 
for Capability Based Planning, Operational Planning, Policy and Strategy (AF/A5X-C), 
ensure the results from these analyses are represented in the Air Force Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE), Strategic Planning, and Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process from the operational 
risk perspective (FAT, 2008). 
In preparation for the CRRA, many Air Force and Joint strategic guidance 
documents are reviewed, including the Joint concepts, Combatant Commander 
(COCOM) Integrated Priority Lists (IPL), the Air Force Master Capabilities Library 
(MCL), Joint Capability Areas (JCA), lessons learned from recent military operations 
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(both wartime and contingency) and the shortfalls from the previous CRRA.  From this 
detailed review, broad lists of mission areas are identified; AF/A5X-C focuses on the 
mission areas where success is deemed most crucial.  During the CRRA analysis, two 
essential questions are addressed: “1) what is the Air Force’s overall probability of 
success in accomplishing each task, and 2) what is the consequence to the warfighting 
COCOM due to a particular mission’s probability of success?”  Together the answers to 
these questions determine the risk related to the capability. (FAT, 2008) 
2.2 CRRA Analysis using PSMs 
The CRRA is intended to be an analytically supported assessment approach that 
provides the flexibility and adaptability required to meet the ever changing requirements 
of the Air Force.  It was developed to be compatible with the Air Force Modeling and 
Simulation efforts, and to be relevant across the entire range of joint operations (HQ 
USAF, 2007:6).   
Beginning with the 2007 CRRA, a method called Process Sequence Modeling 
(PSM) was developed and employed to help determine the most efficient and effective 
use of limited Air Force resources.  It did this by identifying where the greatest shortfalls 
and highest consequences were located within the outlined scenarios (Bonafede, 2006).   
PSMs are the primary analytical tool for the CRRA analysis and the continuing 
Capabilities-Based Assessment Methodology (CBAM).  PSMs are architecture-based 
activity models, consisting of a series of activities or tasks, each represented in the model 
as a “node” (Bonafede, 2006:1).  The degree that PSMs are based on larger enterprise 
architectures varies between the CONOPS.  Within the Agile Combat Support CONOPS, 
an enterprise architecture based on DoDAF version 1.5 has been created.  This 
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architecture currently contains an All Views (AV)-1, AV-2, Operational View (OV)-1, 
OV-2, OV-5, and OV-6c with future releases of other various views planed (ACS 
Architecture team, 2008:11-12).  The two views that have supported the development of 
PSMs most directly are the OV-5 Node Tree and the OV-6c Operational Event/Trace 
Description.  It is from the operational activities listed in the OV-5 and their arrangement 
in sequences in the OV-6c that PSMs are developed (Janus, 2008).  In addition to using 
the OV-5 and sequencing information, it has been shown the production of an OV-2 
Operational Node Connectivity Description can provide a means to graphically show the 
information exchange requirements within the CONOPS.  This can provide information 
about the interconnectivity and interdependence of the capabilities and operations under 
examination (Eller, 2008: 26).  Eller et al. also developed an OV-5 to PSM traceability 
matrix to verify PSM construction and completeness.  Developing enterprise architecture 
as the basis for PSMs ensures they are traceable to strategic guidance, allows for reuse 
from one CRRA to the next, and ensures a more thorough examination of the capability.   
The ability to accomplish the activities in a PSM for the purpose of achieving a 
specific effect demonstrates an Air Force capability.  Therefore, each PSM models an Air 
Force capability.  Each activity is a step, and each step is required to successfully 
complete in order to demonstrate a specified capability.   Additionally, the ability to 
accomplish each of the tasks and activities in the PSM represents sub-capabilities that 
enable the overall PSM capability.  In the 2007 CRRA, these nodes were linked to 
capabilities within the Master Capability Library.  This changed for the 2009 CRRA 
PSMs, where most PSMs link nodes to the Joint Capability Areas (JCAs).  An example 
of a PSM is presented in Figure 2.2.  The goal of PSMs is to bring responsive, repeatable 
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and defendable analytical results to a previously haphazard and inefficient capabilities 
analysis (HQ USAF, 2006).   
 
 
Figure 2.2 Example PSM, extracted from Agile Combat Support 
PSMs are similar to Functional Flow Block Diagrams (FFBDs), long used in 
systems engineering, although there are symbolic, semantic, and syntax differences.  A 
thorough explanation of functional analysis and FFBDs is provided in Appendix A of 
Systems Engineering and Analysis by Blanchard and Fabrycky (Blanchard, 2006:716).  
Within the Unified Modeling Language (UML) PSMs are similar to Activity Diagrams.  
Examples of Activity Diagrams can be found in Applying UML and Patterns by Craig 
Larman (Larman, 2002:607).  Each node in a PSM is assigned Probability of Success 
(P(S)) scores by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from Air Staff, MAJCOMs, Combatant 
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Commander (COCOM), direct reporting agencies, and other services in conjunction with 
AF/A5X-C.  SMEs must have operational experience as well as an in-depth 
understanding of training and procedures (HQ USAF, 2008a:22).  One CRRA 
practitioner described the knowledge and experience required by the SMEs by stating 
“we don’t need Subject Matter PARTICPANTS, we need Subject Matter EXPERTS, the 
“E” is what is important” (FAT, 2008).  Whenever possible, SME P(S) are backed up by 
supporting documentation, modeling & simulation, lessons learned and previous 
experience (FAT, 2008).  After a PSM node is scored, the overall probability of success 
for the PSM is found along with the impact each node has on the overall PSM (HQ 
USAF, 2008a:26-32).  A more thorough explanation of how the probability of success is 
determined is presented in the following section.  While the overall probability of 
completion is important to understand, the more meaningful result of the PSMs is to 
determine the specific areas or tasks that are potential risk drivers for the completion of 
the selected mission.  To uncover these tasks sensitivity analyses are accomplished on the 
PSM (HQ USAF, 2007:17).  SMEs also determine which of the DOTMLPF 
fundamentals influence the successful completion of the node to help determine the root 
cause of the problem as well as assist with the later step of determining a solution to close 
the capability gap, if one exists (HQ USAF, 2008a: 22-23). 
Another important concept developed for the CRRA is the determination of 
Potential Areas to Accept Risk (PAAR).  PAARs are mission areas that are performing 
better than required and therefore offer an opportunity to shift resources from PAARs to 
areas with deficiencies.  Upon discovery of a PAAR, primary assessments are done to 
determine subsequent order effects from accepting additional risk.  PAARs are not 
 14 
 
considered solutions, but suggested areas of additional research where “trade space” 
might be available if needed.  Where PAARs are identified, it is recommended that 
further analysis be done prior to accepting any risk (FAT, 2008).   
PSMs were first developed to support the CRRA (Bonafede, 2006).  However, 
they have been successfully used to assess risk for other purposes.  For example, while 
the CRRA’s purpose is to evaluate current and future capability performance PSMs can 
also be used to demonstrate the risk associated with various future force constructs.  Used 
in this way, they can assist with selecting the appropriate types and quantities of systems 
to fill the capability gaps identified by the CRRA (Eller, 2008).  
2.3 Process Sequence Models 
 This research studied the methods used to develop and analyze PSMs.  The 
assumptions made through the construction and evaluation of PSMs are addressed, and 
the applicability of those assumptions is questioned.  Based on the mission they are trying 
to model, conclusions are made as to the strengths and weaknesses of the current 
approach.   
 A PSM is a basic flow block diagram of the tasks or steps, which need to be 
completed to successfully accomplish the overall mission.  An excerpt of a simple PSM 
is presented in Figure 2.3 (HQ USAF, 2008a: 18). 
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Figure 2.3 PSM Excerpt 
The mission tasks are represented as rectangles while the arrows between the 
rectangles show the sequenced flow of the process (Bonafede, 2006:3).  The arrow also 
communicates that the task at the head of the arrow cannot start until the task at the tail of 
the arrow is complete.  Diamond nodes included in the PSMs are decision nodes.  These 
nodes direct the flow through the model based on whether the condition in the decision 
node is satisfied.  Another important feature of a PSM is a parallel process that allows 
steps within the parallel process to occur at the same time. The start of any one node does 
not require the completion of any of the other nodes in the parallel process.  However, the 
process cannot move beyond the parallel process until all nodes are complete.  An 
example of a PSM parallel process is presented in Figure 2.4 (HQ USAF, 2008a: 17-20). 
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Figure 2.4 PSM Parallel Process 
To analyze these models each node is “scored” by a team of SMEs.  The score is 
the probability the node will be successful to the level that it will allow success for the 
entire PSM (HQ USAF, 2006: 13).  The SMEs are presented a scenario and a description 
of the node they are to score.  Included in the description are assumptions that can be 
made and factors to consider while determining the probability of success.  An example 
of the description the SMEs are provided to assist them with scoring is presented in 
Figure 2.5.  This description is from a node in the Agile Combat Support PSM that 
examines the Air Force’s ability to identify the surge in personnel (AF/A4LX, 2008:11). 
 
3.01.  Identify Surge Requirements:  Scored.  The probability of success of accurately 
assessing and quantifying need for increased manpower during an increase in operation 
tempo (rate of effort) to meet required mission dates well enough and within the 
timeframe needed to be able to successfully complete this PSM, in as much as it depends 
on this node.  Includes capability to differentiate and prioritize between 
AD/ARC/civilian/contractor personnel.    (MCL 5.6.4.1) 
 
Figure 2.5 Example PSM Description 
Studying the description shown in Figure 2.5 leads to some questions about how 
the SMEs determine the score they provide.  Mainly, the score is described as “the 
probability of success of accurately assessing and quantifying…”.  This leads to the 
 question ‘what accuracy is required?
accuracy that allows for the successful completion of the PSM’ and is left up to the SMEs 
to decide.  Therefore, SMEs are 
required for success?’ while the second is 
If two different SMEs determine success differently, the probability of reaching that 
success is likely to be different as well.  Additionally, 
succeeding at different levels of success effects the outcome of a PSM.
addressed in Chapter 4.   
For the purpose of focusing on only one node at a time, SMEs are told to score the 
node as if all previous nodes were successful (HQ USAF, 2008a:40). Because of this, the 
probability of success SMEs assign to the node is ac
score is the probability of success 
The SMEs actually input three probabilities to each node.  The minimum 
expected score (worst day), the most likely score, and the max
day).  This creates a triangular probability 
variable is probability of success
Figure 
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’  Currently, the answer to that question is,
answering two questions.  The first is ‘what 
‘what is the probability of reaching that level
this leads to the question of how 
  These
tually a conditional probability.  The
given the previous nodes were all successful.  
imum expected score (best 
density function (pdf) where the independent 
 as shown in Figure 2.6 (Bonafede, 2006:7).  
 
2.6 Triangular pdf of probabilities 
 ‘The 
accuracy is 
?’  
 issues are 
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Each of the decision nodes is provided a percentage.  The percentage represents 
the expected portion of occurrences that will meet the condition in the decision node.  
The decision node does not adjust or get affected by any events that precede it.  It has no 
knowledge of events that occurred before it and simply serves to provide a weighting to 
the nodes that come after it based on the percentage of occurrence of each path.  In this 
way they are similar to an uncertain event, sometimes called a chance node, in decision 
trees (Holloway, 1979:32).  Once the nodes are populated, a Monte Carlo analysis is 
performed on the PSM.  A Monte Carlo analysis selects a probability for each of the 
nodes based on the triangular distribution entered.  It then analyzes the model to 
determine an overall probability of success for the entire PSM (Bonafede, 2006: 4).  The 
simulation is then run again, this time with different selected values for each of the nodes.  
This simulation is run approximately 2,000 times to find the most likely overall PSM 
probability of success values (FAT, 2008).   
The computations required to find the overall PSM probability of success depends 
on the configuration of the model.  In the PSMs currently used for the CRRA, every node 
needs to complete successfully for the PSM to complete successfully.  Therefore, the 
method used to calculate the total probability of success is simply the product of all of the 
probabilities that were assigned to each node.  Additionally, even if tasks are 
accomplished in parallel with each other, the process still requires each to be 
accomplished; therefore the calculation for the total probability remains the same. 
As an example, the overall probability of success for the two processes in Figure 2.7 is 
identical and is calculated by (HQ USAF, 2007: 22): 
	 
      (1)     
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where P(S)A, P(S)B, P(S)C are the probabilities assigned to each node (Ebeling, 1997: 84). 
    
 
 
Figure 2.7 PSM Computational Equivalents 
Although it isn’t seen on any current PSM reviewed for this research, there is 
nothing to preclude a model from having redundant tasks (Bonafede, 2009).  A redundant 
task doesn’t necessarily need to be accomplished for the successful completion of the 
process.  Since every task does not need to be completed, the algebra describing the total 
probability of success changes to equation 2.  An example of redundant task PSM is 
presented in Figure 2.8. 
	 
                            (2)       
        
 
 
Figure 2.8 PSM Redundant Nodes 
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For situations where more than two nodes are redundant the total probability can 
be represented with the expression (Ebeling, 1997: 86): 
	 
 1  ∏ 1                                   (3) 
 
To calculate PSMs with decision nodes, the equation has to account for the 
change in analyzed nodes depending on the path the process follows.  For example, given 
the process model in Figure 2.9., if 60% of the occurrences result in a YES decision 
while 40% of the occurrences result in a NO decision, then the closed form equation for 
the PSM would be (FAT, 2008): 
	 
 . 6  .4   (4) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9 PSM Decision Node 
The equations for the overall probability of success for the PSM presented here 
assume the individual steps or activities are independent from each other (Ebeling, 1997: 
84).  This is an important assumption of PSMs that will be addressed in Chapter 4. 
As mentioned above, in addition to the calculation of the total probability of 
success, a sensitivity analysis is conducted to determine the node that has the highest 
impact on the overall probability and ultimately the consequence.  Two different 
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sensitivity analyses are conducted, availability and incremental.  Originally the 
incremental technique was referred to as the marginal sensitivity measure (Bonafede, 
2006: 6).  For the availability method the probability of success for the node being 
examined is changed by half of the difference between the most-likely probability and a 
probability of 1.0 while all other nodes remain at their most likely value.  For example, if 
the node was scored with a 0.8, the node probability would be changed to 0.9 whereas if 
the node was scored 0.9 the score would be changed to 0.95.  Once the score, or 
probability of success, is changed for one node the total PSM probability is found and 
related to operational consequence.  That node is then returned to its original value, the 
next node in the process is changed and the total probability is again calculated.  The 
node that has the largest impact on the probability of success, and thus the consequence 
score, will be listed as the main driver.  A list of nodes could then be generated in order 
of decreasing impact on the PSM probability of success.  Two factors determine how 
much impact any particular node will have.  The first is the node’s orientation in the 
PSM.  If the node is accomplished every time the PSM is evaluated it will have more 
impact than a node positioned after a decision node that is accomplished only 20% of the 
time.  The second factor is the value of the node’s original most likely score.  All other 
factors being equal, a node originally scored 0.2 is going to be a larger driver than a node 
scored 0.8.  This is because during the sensitivity analysis the node that is 0.2 will triple 
its value to 0.6 whereas the node scored 0.8 will only change to 0.9.  This method was 
decided upon by the CRRA practitioners to highlight the nodes that have a lower 
probability of success (FAT, 2008).   
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To accomplish the incremental sensitivity analysis the first partial derivative of the 
closed form PSM equation is computed with respect to each node.  The node that results 
in the greatest partial derivative will be the highest risk driver.  Again, a list can be 
computed to order the tasks (or nodes) in decreasing order of sensitivity.  It should be 
noted that this method also places greater weight on the nodes that have the lowest 
probability of success.  To see why this is, examine a PSM with three nodes-- A, B, C.  
The total probability is P(S)Total= P(S)A P(S)B P(S)C.  The partial derivatives with respect 
to each node are:    
	 
 PSPS    
	 
 PSPS    
	 
 PSPS 
 If PA =0.8, PB=0.2 and PC=0.7 then the total value of the first derivatives would be: 
	 
 .14,        
	 
 .56,       
	 
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Node B would be listed as the driver because it has the highest partial derivative.  It had 
the highest partial derivative because it had the lowest probability of success (FAT, 
2008). 
2.4  PSM Assumptions 
Constructing models of a process and calculating the probability of success using this 
method makes certain assumptions about the system or process it is modeling.  These 
assumptions are appropriate if the real-world system meets certain criteria.  These criteria 
are: 
• Each activity or task represented by the nodes has only two relevant states; either 
success or failure.  Another way to describe this is the task is a boolean event 
whose possible states are mutually exclusive. 
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• If an activity does have degrees of success, the degree by which it succeeds does 
not impact the chance of success for the entire PSM or for any other node, thus 
the degrees of success are not relevant. 
• The success of each activity can only be dependent on whether the activities that 
occur before it were successful and are independent in all other ways.  The score 
the SME’s give each node is the probability of success given the previous nodes 
were all successful.  The fact that nodes can only be dependent on the nodes that 
occur before them implies they cannot be dependent on nodes that occur in 
parallel with them.  For the bottom process in Figure 2.7 node B could not depend 
on node C or vice versa.   Additionally, the score for one activity will not affect 
the score on another activity; therefore the scores are independent from each 
other. 
• The node represents an activity or task that is a discrete event that has a beginning 
and end.  Without a specific end the process could not continue to the next node. 
• The nodes, which are discrete events, represent a task or activity in the 
appropriate timeframe relative to other tasks or activities.  For example, a three 
node PSM consisting of a node representing the recruiting of new personnel, a 
node representing the training of the personnel, and a node representing the 
personnel performing aircraft maintenance activities is to be evaluated.  If the 
question to answer is ‘what is the probability the airplane can be adequately 
maintained during a 30-day period of high tempo?’, the probability of success 
entered for the recruitment of new personnel shouldn’t be the probability to 
recruit during this period of high tempo because those recruits are not the ones 
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performing the maintenance.  The recruits performing the maintenance are those 
who joined the workforce some time in the past.  Therefore, to answer the 
question of ability to maintain airplanes during the 30-day window, the 
probability that recruitment was done successfully in the past would have to be 
evaluated.  
 When examining the situations that are currently modeled with PSMs to 
determine if they meet the above criteria, what should be remembered is that all models 
are wrong; some are useful (Kurkowski, 2007).  Any model needs to find the correct 
balance between being complex enough to represent reality, while remaining simple 
enough to construct and analyze.  A simpler model is more practical to build, but might 
not be as realistic.  In other words, an attempt to make the model "correct" could make 
the model less useful to practitioners.  However, committing the error in the other 
direction can be even more dangerous.  Making assumptions about the modeled system 
for the purpose of simplifying the model can result in a model that has no bearing on 
reality if those assumptions are not valid.  The model could reveal supposed insights that 
do not correlate to reality and force decisions to be made that only later prove to be poor.  
Constructing models that either require too much information or ones that are too 
simplistic will result in wasted resources, frustration among users, and can lead to a 
situation where the Air Force is not able to provide a capability when called upon.  With 
those warnings in mind, an evaluation of the current use of PSMs is presented. 
 While reviewing the PSMs used for the 2007 CRRA, as well as a sample of PSMs 
for the 2009 CRRA, some questions concerning the assumptions were noted.  For 
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example, assuming each node can be modeled as having only two states, success or 
failure, significantly constrains the information that can be learned from the analysis and 
might not be appropriate.  While this assumption seems appropriate for some nodes, other 
nodes seem to be better served if they are allowed to undertake other various states.  
Nodes that appear to meet these assumptions well are those that represent activities that 
are clearly discrete actions in time and either result, or do not result, in an outcome.  An 
example of this is a node that represents the task Deploy Weapon.  It is reasonable to 
assume the only cases that matter, or need to be examined, are if the weapon deploys or 
doesn’t deploy, while any case in between can be correctly placed in the category of not 
deploying successfully.  However, there are other activities, many of them residing 
within combat support, for which the degree a task is accomplished is important.  
Examples of nodes that seem to fall squarely into this category are ones dealing with 
training or the assignment of personnel to a particular task, where quantities are 
important.  There are many other areas this applies to as well.  This also touches on a 
desire heard from CRRA practitioners to not only model the Air Force’s ability to deliver 
a particular capability but to capture what level of quality or sufficiency that capability 
can be delivered (FAT, 2008).  A model that allows certain activities of interest to take on 
an independent variable other than probability of success, and to allow that variable to 
have multiple levels, would be beneficial to the CRRA process. 
The hypothesis that the degree to which a task is accomplished matters to the 
outcome of the PSM implies that the degree somehow affects the results of other nodes, 
and consequently the whole PSM.  This challenges another assumption already listed, 
that each node’s score is independent from other nodes’ scores.  This also relates to the 
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desire heard during the course of the research, especially among the Agile Combat 
Support community, to show how the accomplishment of their tasks directly contributes 
to the outcome of Operational CONOPs PSMs (FAT, 2008).  To accomplish this, a 
model which allows individual tasks or activities to map to and influence the likelihood 
of accomplishing other individual tasks, some of which reside across many different 
PSMs, or CONOPs, would be beneficial.   
The assumption that each node is a discrete event that must end prior to the next 
one beginning requires a more nuanced examination to determine its validity, or even if 
the assumption is actually being made in the current technique.  This resides in the 
apparent confusion over whether or not these models are in fact models of processes, as 
their name would suggest, or whether they are more akin to reliability block diagrams.  If 
it is a true process model then the order of the nodes does matter and ensuring the nodes 
represent activities that have a completion is important to moving to the next activity in 
the process.  However, if these are reliability block diagrams, it is valid to have a series of 
activities all occurring at the same time that will only complete at the end of the 
examination period.  A simple reliability block diagram is presented in Figure 2.10 for an 
example of the reliability a tire will stay on a car (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 2006:379-
380).  One “activity” or possibly more appropriate “success condition” is that the lug nuts 
will stay on, another is that the tire stays on the rim.  These both need to continuously 
happen at the same time for the success of the tire staying on the car. 
 
Figure 2.10 Example Reliability Block Diagram 
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These two success conditions are not discrete activities.  They are conditions that must be 
maintained simultaneously during the entire period of examination. 
There are tasks within PSMs that would suggest the model is meant to be a 
reliability block diagram; however, if that were the case there would be no need to 
include AND paths that attempt to show mandatory tasks that occur at the same time 
while others do not.  Additionally, there does not appear to be a consensus among CRRA 
practitioners as to the answer of this question.  The reason there is not a consensus is this 
does not matter if you maintain the assumptions listed above, mainly that the tasks are 
independent from each other.  The mathematical model to represent total probability of 
success for the PSM is the same either way. As described in the sections above, it would 
be the multiplication of the probability of success for each of the nodes.  However, when 
relaxing the assumption of independence it becomes necessary to understand which 
nodes represent activities performed in a process and which nodes represent activities that 
are ongoing aspects of the environment within which the process is being run.  The 
timing of activities also need to be considered when dependence is added to the model to 
ensure that prior to the execution of a node, all nodes it is dependent upon have executed.  
This leads to the final caution that the nodes are both modeled and evaluated by SMEs in 
the appropriate time frame relative to each other.       
2.5 Consequence Values  
The second part of the CRRA process is determining the consequence associated 
with the output of the PSM.  The PSM probability of success is linked to operational 
consequences through a methodology and excel spreadsheet tool developed at AF/A5X-
C.  To accomplish this, members of AF/A5X-C meet with the Combatant Commands to 
 determine how the performance of the PSMs affect their ability to comp
missions.   
The first step is to elicit from the COCOMs what
(GE) and the Limited Military Value
is defined as “The probability of success for a particular mission,
warfighter has enough/excess capability to successfully complete mission objectives 
within acceptable levels of consequence”
success for a particular mission, below which is negligible military v
warfighter”.  These regions are placed onto a graph as shown in Figure 
Figure 
Next, COCOMs select severity factors to consider for the particular mission being 
executed.  Severity factors are ar
the full range of consequences
public security confidence, loss of friendly infrastructure, 
to name a few (Bonafede, 2006: 5)
which COCOMs select 2-5 they feel are most relevant to the mission under examination.  
Each severity factor is then divided into 6 consequence values pertaining to catastrophic, 
extensive, major, substantial, modest, and minor outcomes.  Descriptions of each 
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lete operational 
 are the Good Enough Value
 (LMV) PSM probabilities (Bonafede, 2006: 2)
 above which the 
.  The LMV is defined as “The probability of 
alue to the 
2.11 (FAT, 2008)
 
2.11 Consequence Value Ranges 
eas of concern that should be considered to understand 
.  Examples of severity factors are friendly casualties, 
and adverse economic impact, 
.  AF/A5X-C has developed 16 severity factors
 
.  GE 
. 
, from 
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consequence value are provided in a word picture to adequately provide examples of 
what would constitute that value.  The Loss of Friendly Infrastructure description is 
shown in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1 Example of Consequence Description
 
 
Following the selection of the severity factors, the COCOMs determine what the 
worst case, most likely, and best case consequence values are for each of the three 
probability regions identified in the first step (below LMV, between LMV and GE, and 
above GE) as shown in Table 2.2. 
 
 
 Table 
From the information gathered and a relative weight to each of the severity factors 
selected, a graph is generated shown in Figure 
Figure 
This graph relates the overall 
axis, to consequence values, shown on the vertical axis
is generated that relates to a consequence value throu
earlier, this is run approximately 2
Additionally, during the sensitivity analysis the node that creates the greatest change in 
consequence score is determined to be the driving 
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2.2. Consequence Scoring 
 
2.12. 
2.12 COCOM Consequence Curve 
probability of success for a PSM, shown on the horizontal 
.  For each run of the PSM a P(S) 
gh the chart above.  As stated 
,000 times to find the consequence of the PSM.  
node (HQ USAF, 2008b) (FAT, 2008)
 
.  
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This analysis completes the analytic portion of the CRRA evaluation process, evaluating 
both the capability gaps as well as the consequences to the warfighter if a capability gap 
goes unfilled. 
 The score calculated by the analytic method described above is only part of the 
assessment.  There is also supplementary information elicited from the SMEs in the form 
of a rationale to justify the P(S) they assigned.  During interviews with several SMEs and 
stakeholders it was purported that the rationale given was actually more important than 
the probability scores.  The rationale, it was reasoned, was the basis of the capabilities’ 
performance and any underlying gaps that could be associated with a probability of 
failure.  However, during a SME scoring conference, there seemed to be significant 
confusion concerning what constituted node failure instead of a somewhat ambiguous 
idea of milder capability degradation.  This question was pondered by many in 
attendance, but was not addressed in the conference, with hopes that future iterations of 
CRRA analysis could extend to a level where varied levels of success can be considered.   
2.6 Architecture 
While architecture in its classical form as the art and science of designing and 
erecting buildings has been a discipline for thousands of years, the idea of general 
systems architecture and enterprise architecture are much more recent (Architecture, 
2000).  As a tool, architecting becomes useful when trying to define, describe, and 
understand complex and unprecedented systems.  As a system grows, the number of 
interrelationships grows at a much faster pace than the number of components; this 
requires tools and techniques to understand the various aspects of the system (Maier and 
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Rechtin, 2002:5).  In a book on Service Oriented Architecture, the authors describe the 
evolution and need for architecture in this way: 
“In the beginning, there were programs, and programs were good, and programs 
didn’t need no stinking architectures.  And then there was business and the 
businesses grew, and the programs grew, and chaos was on the face of the business.  
And so, in an effort to create order, programmers adopted systematic structures to 
organize the programs and help the business. And any structure, be it a strip mall or 
the Taj Mahal, or even Noah’s Ark, has some underlying design, however 
haphazard, know as an architecture.” (Hurwitz, 2006) 
 
Through this somewhat humorous explanation of why architecture is important, it 
becomes obvious that as projects become bigger, architecture can help maintain order, 
focus, and direction.  This same phenomenon occurred during the creation of classical 
architecting.  Thousands of years ago the Greeks and the Romans built cities, aqueducts, 
road systems, and defenses.  The increasing complexity of the systems they created led to 
the formulation of new tools to understand them (Rechtin, 1991:xiii).  The current 
practices in systems architecting have their root in the mid-1980’s (GAO, 2003:1).  
During this time there was another increase in the complexity of systems under design, 
this time in the form of information technology (Rechtin, 1991:xiv). 
2.7 Architecture Frameworks 
With the maturation of system architectures, various architectural frameworks 
have been developed.  A framework is a standard by which architectures are described 
and is analogous to blueprint standards (Maier and Rechtin, 2002:221).  Current 
frameworks can be traced to the late 1980s.  It was at that time that John Zachman wrote 
an article published in IBM Systems Journal titled “A Framework for Information 
Systems Architecture”.  This paper laid the foundation for what became known as the 
Zachman framework which, according to the federal government’s Chief Information 
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Officer’s Council, “has received worldwide acceptance as an integrated framework for 
managing change in enterprises and the systems that support them” (CIO Council, 
1999:19).  In his seminal work, Zachman examined classical architecture to uncover a 
descriptive framework that could be used to describe information systems (Zachman, 
1987).  He described two architectural “observations” that became the basis for his 
framework and subsequent frameworks.  The first is that the architecture has different 
representations.  These were called “fundamental architectural representations” while 
contemporary frameworks have called these representations views or viewpoints.  He 
explained there are three representations based on the perspective of the owner, designer, 
and builder of the system.  An important distinction made by Zachman was that the three 
views are not merely descriptions of the system at varying levels of detail but are actually 
different in nature and content showing the same system from a different point of view.  
Level of detail is an independent variable and can exist at any desired level within each of 
the representations.  The second observation was that within each representation there are 
different descriptions that answer the six interrogatives, who, what, where, why, when, 
and how.  Even though each of these descriptions addresses the same system, they are 
independent from each other and provide different information about the system.  The 
combination of the representations (or views) and descriptions into a matrix forms the 
foundation of the Zachman framework (Zachman, 1987:282).  A more recent example of 
the Zachman Framework that incorporates more than three views is presented in Table 
2.3.  
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Table 2.3. Zachman Framework (Ambler, 2004) 
 
 
Several other frameworks have been developed since Zachman proposed his in 
1987 to include frameworks by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE), the International Standards Organization (ISO) and the DoD (Maier and Rechtin, 
2002:222).  The DoD released its first framework in 1996 in response to passage of the 
Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, later designated the Clinger-
Cohen Act (CCA) of 1996 (DoD, 2007:3-2).  The CCA mandates “An integrated DoD 
architecture with operational, system, and technical views shall be developed, maintained 
and applied…” (DoD CIO, 2006:168).  As the original name of the act suggests, this 
applied to information technology management.  In June 1996 the DoD released the 
Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and 
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Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Architecture Framework version 1.0.  That Framework was 
updated and released as C4ISR Architecture Framework version 2.0 in December of 
1997.  Two months later the DoD mandated the framework be used for all C4ISR 
architecture descriptions (DoD, 2007:ES-3).  The framework continued to expand and in 
2003 was renamed to the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) to capture the intent to 
use this framework for not just IT systems but for all DoD systems to included enterprise 
architecting.   
The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) defines architecture 
framework as: 
“a tool which can be used for developing a broad range of different architectures. It 
should describe a method for designing an information system in terms of a set of 
building blocks, and for showing how the building blocks fit together. It should 
contain a set of tools and provide a common vocabulary. It should also include a list 
of recommended standards and compliant products that can be used to implement 
the building blocks.”                   (TOGAF, 2008) 
 
To that end, the research focused on three of what was understood to be the most relevant 
architectural frameworks for this project.  The DoDAF Version 1.5, the Ministry of 
Defense Architectural Framework (MODAF) and the Draft DoDAF Version 2.0 were 
analyzed in detail.  As previously mentioned, there are several other types of architecture 
frameworks available, however this research was focused toward these particular 
frameworks due to the intended audience.  
DoDAF, which has been the standard DoD guidance since it was initially 
approved in 2003 as Version 1.0, later upgraded in 2007 to Version 1.5, describes 29 
architectural models that provide guidance to consistently represent different aspects of a 
system depending on the information needed to be displayed. 
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The MODAF, used by the United Kingdom, adopted the DoDAF v 1.5 views.  
The All View (AV), Operational View (OV), Systems and Services View (SV), and the 
Technical Standards View (TV), were upgraded by adding Strategic Views (StVs), 
Service Oriented Views (SOVs), and Acquisition Views (AcVs).   
In comparison, the Draft DoDAF v 2.0 that was reviewed for this research has a 
total of 49 different models to display the various representations.  These are now called 
“Viewpoints” rather than “Views”.  It incorporated, among other things, similar views to 
those found in the MODAF.  For example, the Capability Viewpoint (CV) can be directly 
compared with MODAFs StV, where “The viewpoints within the CV are high-level and 
describe capabilities using terminology which is easily understood by decision makers 
and used for communicating a strategic vision regarding capability evolution” (DoD, 
2008a:25).  Similarly, the updated Services Viewpoint can be related to the MODAF 
SOV, which supports the operational and capability functions.  Furthermore, the Project 
Viewpoint was developed using feedback from the Acquisition community and can be 
compared to the MODAF AcV.  For ease of reference, the following pictorial 
representations have been provided so the reader may compare between the Draft 
DoDAF v 2.0 and the MODAF. 
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DoDAF 2.0 Views 
(DoDAF, 2008b:126) 
 
 
(MODAF, 2008) 
 
Figure 2.13 DoDAF and MODAF Views 
Additional viewpoints were added or updated to enhance the capabilities of the 
DoDAF architecture.  For example, in the DoDAF v 1.5, Services and Systems Views 
were linked together, whereas in the Draft DoDAF v 2.0 they are separated into distinct 
Viewpoints.  Furthermore, a Data and Information Viewpoint was created using OV-7 
and SV-11 views of DoDAF v 1.5.  Figure 2.17 provides a pictorial overview of how the 
updated Draft DoDAF v 2.0 compares with the older DoDAF v 1.5. 
Previously 
OV-7 
And 
SV-11 
Equivalent 
Views 
 38 
 
DoDAF V1.5 Evolution to DoDAF V2.0 
(DoDAF, 2008b:127) 
Figure 2.14 DoDAF Evolution 
Since the creation of the DoDAF in 2003 there has been effort to transition from a 
product-centric framework to one that is data-centric.  For example, as opposed to 
focusing on the viewpoint and description of a particular architecture product, the 
emphasis would be on creating a common database of architectural information from 
which various products can be built.  By changing the focus, the creation of architectures 
that share common data descriptions across several viewpoints becomes easier to 
construct, a result referred to as an integrated architecture.  Additionally, models can be 
generated that don’t necessarily fit into one of the viewpoints described within DoDAF.   
2.8 Conclusion 
 This chapter provided background to the Air Force’s Capability Based 
Assessment, specifically the CRRA, introduced Process Sequence Models, and explained 
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how the probability of success is related to mission outcomes and consequences.  This 
chapter also provided background to Enterprise and Systems Architecture and 
Architecture Frameworks.  Additionally, changes to the DoDAF in the draft version 2.0 
that were deemed important to this research were presented.  An understanding of the 
basics of these topics greatly assists in understanding the analysis and suggestions 
presented in Chapter 4 and the conclusions presented in Chapter 5.  Next, the 
methodology that was used to answer the research questions and develop research 
conclusions is presented in Chapter 3. 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Overview 
To answer the first research question listed in Chapter 1, “How is architecture 
currently being used to support the CRRA?”, Process Sequence Models (PSMs) as they 
are currently performed have been explained along with the assumptions they make about 
the system they model.  It was found PSM assumptions force limitations on the model 
that would be beneficial to remove.  Additionally, those assumptions might not even be 
appropriate for some situations currently modeled by PSMs.  This chapter introduces a 
methodology to relax those assumptions.  Following this chapter, Chapter 4 provides 
more details on the new methodology and demonstrates its application. 
When answering the second research question, “How can the current architectural 
models be extended to make them more appropriate and useful?”, it was an aim of this 
research to keep any proposed architectural models based on the current techniques of 
PSMs.  This is to prevent the CRRA practitioners from having to start from scratch if 
they choose to adopt the conclusions of this research.  Consequentially, it allows the 
CRRA practitioner to make incremental improvements to their modeling techniques and 
therefore increase the chance the suggestions are considered and implemented.  The other 
reason the research aimed to extend PSMs as opposed to completely deviating from them 
is that PSMs do have value that has been proven in actual use for years.  Any critique of 
the current technique should not be construed to mean the research has determined PSMs 
have not been useful to the purpose they have been applied.   
The improved model suggested by this research, called Extended Sequence 
Models (ESMs), will continue to result in an overall probability of success score that can 
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be attributed to an operational consequence level identical to the current PSM method.  
The probability of success will be determined by listing all activities necessary for the 
demonstration of a capability, also identical to the PSM technique.  ESMs will continue 
to require Subject Matter Expert’s (SMEs) knowledge and judgment to predict the 
performance of activities within an overall scenario and those performances will be 
captured in probability density functions (pdf).  Identical sensitivity analysis, availability 
and incremental, can be performed on the ESM as performed on the PSMs.  Additionally, 
the SMEs will still provide rationale for the scores they provide, which is one of the most 
important steps in the current PSM technique. 
To the maximum extent possible, the only difference between PSMs and ESMs 
are those portions specifically improved.  The first improvement allows activities to take 
on metrics other than success or failure, such as metrics of quality or sufficiency.  The 
second improvement allows an activity’s pdf to adjust based on the outcome of other 
nodes which it depends.  This relationship is approximated using the techniques of linear 
regression to find the least squares fit for the data provided by the SMEs.  These 
dependencies are completely determined by the SMEs and the CRRA practitioners to 
focus on areas they feel are most important.  Third, ESMs improve PSMs by explicitly 
acknowledging that not all nodes represent specific activities to be accomplished, rather 
some represent environmental factors that are dictated by the scenario and change the 
ability to perform certain activities.  ESMs are explained fully in the next chapter by 
presenting the technique in a step by step process. 
To answer the third research question, “What other architectural models can be 
built and analyzed that would assist the CRRA?”, an understanding of the current method 
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was acquired through reading CRRA documentation, interviewing CRRA stakeholders, 
and attending a PSM scoring session.  From there, three architectural models were 
decided upon that would allow the SMEs to provide more accurate scores to ESM nodes 
while at the same time making the scores they provide more defendable.  The creation of 
these architectural models is “Step 0” of the ESM construction technique.  They are 
developed for the purpose of providing the SMEs and CRRA practitioners the most 
detailed and accurate information possible to increase the reliability and defendability of 
the CRRA. 
3.2 Summary 
With an overview of the methods used to answer the research questions presented, 
the next chapter explains in detail the outcome of the method and provides examples of 
their implementation.  Finally, Chapter 5 presents conclusions, recommendations, and 
areas for further research. 
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4. Analysis and Results 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with an explanation of architectural models that can be 
developed at the commencement of the Capability Review and Risk Assessment (CRRA) 
to improve Extended Sequence Model (ESM) construction, scoring, and execution.  
Following this explanation, the ESM technique is presented.  To conclude the chapter, the 
ESM technique is tested by applying it to a portion of an Agile Combat Support (ACS) 
Process Sequence Model (PSM) currently in use to support the 2009 CRRA.  
4.2  Architecture Framework Analysis 
While there are exceptions, most DoD processes do not require the use of any 
specific architectural view or product.  Even though they are not always required, the use 
of a variety of views and products can streamline product deployment and reduce 
confusion.  There are various examples, such as DoD Directive 5000.02 and CJCSI 
3170.01F Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), which signify 
the importance of providing architecture information by requiring specific views for 
different development stages of a system.  By using a well developed and thoroughly 
planned architecture, the CRRA analysis can be more understandable, more readily 
accepted, and more defendable under scrutiny. 
A significant concern of many individuals and teams alike is that building 
architecture is both time consuming and ineffective.  This is partially due to the mistaken 
belief that architecture views are built for their own sake and that they are an end product 
instead of an analysis tool to help the user.  Volume I of the Draft DoDAF v 2.0 stresses 
this concept by stating  
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“Architecture views (formerly ‘products’) are no longer the end goal, but are 
described solely to facilitate useful access to information in the architecture 
database. All views are tailorable. The requirements for data completeness and 
self-consistency within the data schema are more critical than the view chosen at 
any particular time by a particular user.  Analytics, properly conducted, 
represent a powerful tool for the decision-maker, ensuring that the most 
appropriate and current, as well as valid data is used for decision-making” 
(DoD, 2008a:82). 
 
It also takes this idea further by asserting “Architectures well designed, and consistent 
with the purpose for which they were created, are well suited to the analytic process” 
(DoD, 2008a:83).  A complete list of suggested architectural views and their 
representations may be found in volume 2 of the Draft DoDAF v 2.0.   
As part of this research, many of the CRRA stakeholders were interviewed 
concerning their knowledge and opinion of the architecture that surrounds the CRRA, 
and more specifically, the PSM analysis.  Some had the mistaken belief that architecture 
was simply limited to DoDAF views, while others believed that using DoDAF or any 
other formal architecture framework would be a hindrance to the PSM analysis as they 
considered the architecture too “inflexible” to be useful.  One stakeholder even went so 
far as to state how they had to “divorce themselves from the architecture” to develop a 
useful analysis tool.  However, others believed that architecture would be highly 
beneficial to the CRRA analysis and were especially interested in developing 
architectures that could show relationships as well as redundancy.  These practitioners 
theorized that showing relationships between required capabilities and the capabilities 
provided by Air Force systems and services could expose redundancies and gaps (FAT, 
2008).     
Chapter 2 presented how architectural products are used to assist with the 
construction of PSMs, namely the use of an OV-5 and OV-6c, as well as an OV-5 to 
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PSM traceability matrix (Eller 2008:190).  Chapter 2 also presented previous work that 
showed the development of an OV-2 can be used in conjunction with the OV-5 to 
provide information about the interconnectivity and interdependence of the capabilities 
under examination (Eller, 2008: 26).  The creation of these models is still essential to the 
ESM process as they tie the activities under examination to the Air Force Concept of 
Operations (CONOPs) and ultimately to higher level DoD guidance.  However, by using 
the different viewpoints associated with the Draft DoDAF 2.0, a better representation of 
the vital information can be developed, ultimately leading to a better analysis of the 
capabilities.  A specific example of this is the new Capability Viewpoint, which offers the 
ability to help the CRRA stakeholders understand the strategic and political emphasis 
placed on a requirement.  Given there are many different capabilities available to the 
decision makers that potentially offer a similar end result, having the strategic guidance 
available will enable the CRRA practitioners to perform the best possible analysis by 
only considering the capabilities relevant to the scenario.  For example, if the end goal is 
to eliminate the opposing force’s early warning system, there may be multiple ways to 
accomplish the mission; however, knowing any political or strategic limitations may 
reduce the available options, thereby enabling the SMEs to only focus on mission areas 
and systems relevant to the scenario.  A capability gap may be emphasized if previously 
unknown limitations (such as troop strength, number and type of aircraft, or political 
limitations) are divulged to PSM developers and the SMEs responsible for scoring the 
PSMs.  For these reasons it is important to provide the SMEs with more scenario specific 
information.  
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Based on what this research was able to uncover, the scoring guidance, to include 
scenario assumptions and limitations, are provided to SMEs in text paragraph form.  The 
SMEs have the daunting task of reading, interpolating, and understanding the 
ramifications any action or inaction would have on probability of success while putting 
the scenario in context with the current and future world climates.  Furthermore, the text 
appeared to lack specific explanations of what resources would be at the disposal of the 
Air Force in the scenario.  For example, a probability of success provided under the 
assumption of adequate manpower or correct configuration of airframes may not be an 
accurate depiction of the true probability of success.  While the CRRA scenarios contain 
the strategic goals of that scenario, it is unclear if the strategic guidance set forth in the 
scenarios approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is adequately 
explained to, or understood by, the CRRA practitioners or SMEs.  Such information 
should be considered during the PSM construction, scoring and analysis processes.   
The Capability Viewpoint (CV), can communicate various types of data, though 
normally they are used to relate high-level strategic information and guidance.  A well-
developed CV can directly state overall strategic goals, political considerations, 
budgetary, time or material constraints and possibly other considerations that may be 
applicable to the given scenario.  By incorporating Capability Viewpoints into the design 
and development of the PSMs or ESMs, Stakeholders can ensure that strategic guidance 
is not lost between the approved scenarios and the PSM or ESM scoring.  By presenting 
the developed Capability Viewpoints to the SMEs during the scoring session, SMEs may 
help uncover any hidden capability gaps brought out by the strategic guidance.  The 
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research suggests a simplified strategic guidance using a CV-1, as described in the Draft 
DoDAF v 2.0.  An example is provided in Figure 4.1. 
Vision (CV-1): Imaginary Country Scenario 
Scenario:   Imaginary Country has internal political opposition from the flourishing Authoritarian Red 
Party to the current ruling power (Blue Party).  The United States, a strong ally of Imaginary 
Country and the Blue Party leadership, has a vested interest in retaining strong economic and 
political ties to Imaginary Country.  Provide military and diplomatic assistance to the current 
ruling party in an effort to thwart advances of the Red Party.  Due to security measures, use of 
in-country facilities are not optimal, nearest bed down is Another Country, 807 nautical miles 
due south of Capitol City, Imaginary Country. 
Objectives: 
 1.  Retain diplomatic and economic ties to Blue Party 
 2.  Ensure populace not harassed into submission by Red Party 
 3.  Retain good will and support with Imaginary Country population 
 4.  Limit damage of current infrastructure, reducing threat to population and cost to rebuild 
 5.  Retain diplomatic standing with current and future allies 
 6.  Limit neighboring country strain on resources by influx of refugees from Imaginary Country 
 7.  Limit increase in operations tempo to 125% of current operations tempo 
 
Authorizations: 36,000 military personnel (8,000 Air Force, Specific AFSCs & Numbers can be listed 
here) 
25 Aircraft [A-10 (10); B-1B (3); B-2 (2); B-52 (1); F-16 (8); KC-135 (1)] 
 
Limitations:   
 1.  Budgetary constraints 
 2.  Manpower shortages (330,000 members - # currently deployed/scheduled for deployment) 
 3.  Time constraints 
  a.  Mobilization time (Limited time to react – short notice º 96 hours)  
  b.  Imaginary Country political stabilization time (º 24 months after height of conflict) 
  c.  Timeline for withdrawal (º 4 years) 
 4.  American political climate (Military conflict unpopular) 
 5.  World standing 
Other Considerations: 
 1.  Effect on American Trade  
 2.  Public Support for another contingency 
Figure 4.1 Capability Viewpoint (CV-1) 
As with any scenario, certain capabilities are required for mission success.  
During the research it was discovered that, while the SMEs were asked to provide P(S) 
for many nodes given an identified scenario, they were not given adequate information.  
For example, node 23.04 in the ACS Homestation Sustainment PSM, asked SMEs to give 
a P(S) for “Maintain Law and Order”.  No base was identified, the identified base was 
simply identified as “base X”, instead the SMEs were given suggested bases upon which 
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they should model their score and rationale.  These representative bases were identified 
by name, but no statistics were detailed.  Of course they are different in location, local 
populace, base population, strength, land mass and security requirements, but during the 
scoring it is assumed that any P(S) for base security would be the same.    In the ACS 
Smartbook, the SMEs were instructed to consider between 60% and 75% of the base 
population was deployed and another 10% to 14% could not deploy or perform normally 
(AF/A4LX, 2008:4-7).  Given that the SMEs were not informed of the initial base 
population, or the remaining quantity or quality (skill level) of forces, it would be almost 
impossible for a SME to adequately determine the level of ability to protect a military 
installation.  This cannot be sufficiently accomplished without knowledge of personnel 
strength and an in-depth knowledge of base-specific security requirements.  The 
assumptions made by the CRRA practitioners, concerning the undefined supply of the 
appropriate systems, personnel and facilities were seen as questionable.   
If a CV-1 is adequately prepared and used to populate Systems Views (SV), the 
CRRA practitioners as well as SMEs can use these architectures to rationalize realistic 
P(S) scores.  The current CRRA process literature obtained from AF/A5X-C includes 
mapping systems to the operational activities in the PSMs (AF/A5X-C, 2007).  The 
completion of this step would satisfy the input requirements for generating a SV-5b.  By 
developing SV-5 (either a or b), it is possible to see where there are system redundancies.  
An SV-5a has three intended functions “tracing functional system requirements to user 
requirements, tracing solution options to requirements, and identification of overlaps” 
(DoD, 2008b:249).  Whereas SV-5b “maps systems requirements to user requirements, 
traces solution options to requirements and identifies overlaps” (DoD, 2008b:250).  As 
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the research mentioned earlier, it was desired among the CRRA stakeholders to show 
redundancies.  Any redundancies could be thoroughly evaluated to decide if they were 
necessary or unnecessary.  Unnecessary redundancies could then be offered as trade 
space, while any gaps identified through this process could be analyzed to reveal the 
extent of any deficiencies.  Additionally, this could be used as part of the ongoing CRRA 
Potential Areas to Accept Risk (PAAR) analysis discussed in Chapter 2.  Furthermore, 
any operational activities that do not have a system mapped to it can be examined to 
determine by what means that activity is accomplished, potentially uncovering a 
capability gap.    
From a well developed SV-5 that lists all the systems used to accomplish the 
operational activities, the CRRA practitioners should develop a SV-7 (Systems Measures 
Matrix) that defines performance characteristics and measures for the systems in use.  By 
developing a SV-7, CRRA practitioners as well as SMEs can use their expert knowledge 
to understand what systems the scenario contains, and the associated performance metrics 
of those systems.  Using the advanced scenario data provided will enhance the accuracy 
of any P(S) given by the SME while also giving the SME defendable rationale for the 
scores they provide.  Additionally, the CRRA practitioners can see and understand 
functional redundancies as well associated gaps between the systems.  The following SV-
7 in Table 4.1 was populated with both type and number of aircraft, along with the 
performance measures of the aircraft, for operation in the Imaginary Country scenario.  
Aircraft and their capabilities are presented here as an example; however, this can be 
adapted to describe any type of system or service and the performance characteristics 
they provide or contribute.  Using this viewpoint, numbers, types and configurations of 
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aircraft (for example) can be modified to provide the best combinations using the least 
amount of resources. 
Table 4.1. Systems Measures Matrix (SV-7) 
Systems Measures Matrix (SV-7): Imaginary Country Scenario 
Number of 
Aircraft: 10 3 2 1 8 0 1 
Type of Aircraft: A-10 B-1B B-2 B-52 F-16 F-22A KC-135 
Range 
695 
nm 
6,478 
nm 
6,000 
nm 
7,652 
nm 
1,740 
nm 
1,600 
 nm 
1,500 
nm 
Cannon 30 mm   20 mm 20 mm 
Ground Support Yes Yes Yes 
Nuclear 
Weapons No1 Yes Yes 
Mixed 
Ordinance 
16,000  
lbs 
75,000 
lbs 
50,000 
lbs 
70,000  
lbs 
20,450  
lbs 
Unknown 
lbs 
Naval Support 
(mines) Yes Yes 
Missiles Yes Yes2 Yes 
Rockets Yes Yes 
Transferable fuel 
load: 
200,000 
lbs  
1
 START Treaty Requirement (Air Force Fact Sheet, 2008) 
2
 Air-to-air, Air to ground, Anti-Ship 
Items in Red, may not meet minimum 
capability requirements as defined in CV-1 
 
As with any form of communication, care must be taken to not overload these 
viewpoints with superfluous information.  These viewpoints are meant to be a simplified 
reference so decision makers can base their scores on set parameters that may differ 
between scenarios.  
These suggestions are not intended to indicate an exhaustive list, or lead the 
reader to the conclusion that these are the only applicable views useful for CRRA 
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analysis; a detailed evaluation of the draft DoDAF v 2.0 and its associated viewpoints 
would be beneficial to the CRRA process.   
A common complaint among many of the CRRA practitioners concerned the lack 
of centralized software that was core to the development, planning and scoring of the 
CRRA process.  Currently, there is no single software that holds the entire architecture 
utilized by the CRRA.  A combination of many types of software is used to accomplish 
different parts of the CRRA process.  Software products such as ProVision, Word, Excel, 
Visio and Power Point, to name a few, are used to input, manipulate, store and produce 
the desired output.  Integration of DoDAF v 2.0 compliant architecture is important to 
adequately develop and score the CRRA.  DoDAF v 2.0 compliant software should be 
purchased or developed to provide a central repository for AF architecture used by the 
CRRA, to include the scoring and analysis portions.  By having a central repository, 
development, manipulation and analysis of the architecture could be readily accessed and 
further analyzed iteratively and continuously. 
There are two types of architectural analysis, static and dynamic.  Static analysis 
is based on data which has been extracted from the architecture, such as historical data 
used to develop future trends.  This usually uses simpler tools such as visual 
comparisons.  Conversely, Dynamic analysis is “running” a version of architecture which 
has been developed as an executable model to evaluate performance or run multiple 
variables in different situations (DoD, 2008a:83).  The viewpoints suggested have been 
static architecture.  ESMs, which are discussed in the next section, are a type of 
executable dynamic architecture that has been specifically developed to analyze the 
CRRA. 
 4.3 Modeling capabilities
This section will present a technique
that allows the CRRA practitioners to uncover and examine the dependencies of activities 
within the modeled system.  Additionally, the tech
capability or quantity of assets to examine how it affects operational risk
formally identifying what nodes represent activities that are part of a process and what 
nodes represent environmental conditions of
for any of these conditions.  While this research aims to suggest methods that are useable, 
the usability of the ESM techniques will have to be determined by the CRRA 
practitioners.  
This section is presented as 
successfully perform the technique.
be described. 
Figure 4.
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 using ESMs 
 called Extended Sequence Models (ESM)
nique can account for sufficiency of 
 while more 
 the scenario.  Current PSMs cannot account 
a methodology the CRRA practitioner can follow to 
  Figure 4.2 gives an overview of the method that will 
2 ESM Implementation 
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Step 0 of this process has already been described in the previous section.  The 
creation of architectural products to adequately prepare the SMEs to provide the most 
accurate input possible is a critical preparatory step.  The ESM methodology continues to 
the construction of the model framework.  This can be accomplished by a separate group 
of SMEs from the scoring SMEs or it could be the same group of experts if the CRRA 
practitioners so decide.   
Step 1: The first step to creating the framework is to identify all activities that 
must be accomplished for the successful completion of the mission under examination or 
the successful demonstration of the capability.  This step is accomplished in the current 
method and is supported by an adequate architecture’s OV-5 and OV-6c.   
Step 2:  Environmental factors are then identified.  Environmental factors are 
different from activities in that they are not performed.  They are conditions of the 
environment the activities are being performed in.  Examples of environmental factors 
might be the security environment measured by attacks per day or weather conditions 
such as visibility in miles.   
Step 3:  Each activity and environmental condition should be evaluated to 
determine the metric that will be used to describe it.  Currently, every activity is 
measured by probability of success.  That might remain the dominant metric, however, 
tasks that don’t clearly fit the success or failure assumption can be assigned another 
metric.  For example, a training activity can have the measurement Number of Airmen 
Trained or a supply activity could measure Number of Parts Ordered.  The metric 
doesn’t even have to be one of quantity; it could be one of quality.  For example, an 
activity titled Establish communication link can have a metric Percent of time 
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communication link available.  The metric should be chosen based on two criteria.  The 
first is whether it will likely affect the successful completion of the mission or capability.  
The second is whether the CRRA practitioners determine examining that metric is 
valuable.    
Step 4: Once all activities and environmental factors are identified and assigned a 
measurement variable, they are divided into two categories.  The first group contains 
those nodes that have an outcome that other activities depend on; this group will be called 
the ‘controlling’ nodes.  Controlling nodes can have any type of measurement variable.  
The outcomes of the controlling nodes contribute to the overall probability of success of 
the mission only indirectly through their affect on other nodes. The second group 
contains those nodes that have an outcome that doesn’t affect other nodes; the outcomes 
of these nodes directly affect the successful completion of the overall mission.  This 
group will be called ‘non-controlling’ nodes and can only contain nodes whose 
measurement variable is probability of success.  This is obviously a subjective process.  
With some careful thought, almost every activity can result in performance differences in 
other activities.  The goal is to find the balance that allows more dependencies to be 
uncovered than the current method allows, while keeping the technique usable and 
accessible to the CRRA community.  The increase of represented dependencies greatly 
increases the number of scores SMEs are required to provide, as will become apparent in 
the following paragraphs.   
Step 5:  The controlling nodes need to be linked to the nodes they influence.  The 
graphical way to represent this link is to draw a dotted arrow from the controlling node to 
the node that is depending on it.  This is consistent with the Unified Modeling Language 
 (UML) technique to show a dependency relationship (Larman, 20
nodes can be linked to other controlling 
however, eventually they need to link to a non
probability of success.  The controlling nodes that are intermediary nodes in the chain can 
have any type of metric just like any other controlling node.  Additionally, i
to have non-controlling nodes
The construction of the model might require controlling node variables to be 
combined in a way other than through dependency relationships.  To handle this situation 
a Function Node can be inserted with the appropriate logic assigned to it.  The Function
Node transforms input variables, provided by controlling nodes
solid arrows), through a function to an output 
function node is presented in Figure 4.
symbols, and definitions is presented in Appendix A.
Figure 4.
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02:295).  Controlling 
nodes creating chains of controlling nodes
-controlling node whose metric
t is acceptable 
 that have no dependencies.   
 (graphically shown by 
required by other nodes, an example of a 
3.  A complete list of model components
 
3: Example of a Function Node 
; 
 is 
 
, their 
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Step 6: At this point the model’s framework has been constructed.  The next step 
is populating the nodes with probability density functions provided by the scoring SMEs.  
The SMEs will start with activities that are not dependent on any other activity; these are 
the independent nodes.  If the activity’s measurement variable is probability of success, 
the SME will "score" the node identical to the current method by providing a most likely, 
worst case, and best case value.  Activities that have measurement variables other than 
probability of success will be handled very similarly.  The SME’s will determine the 
most likely value of that variable, the greatest value the variable would attain, and the 
lowest value that the variable would likely attain, given the scenario.   
Step 7: Following the scoring of the independent nodes SME’s attention turns to 
the dependent nodes.  Dependent nodes are those nodes whose probability density 
functions depend on the outcome of one or more controlling nodes.  The SMEs provide 
scores for the dependent node based on the value of the controlling nodes.  For example, 
SMEs decide the probability of successfully on-loading cargo and passengers to an airlift 
mission in the time required depends on the amount of passengers and cargo to be loaded.  
Based on the scenario and the airframe in question SMEs determine, in step 6, the range 
of passengers could be between 0 and 92 while the range of cargo is likely to be in the 
range of 10 to 20 tons with some most likely value for passengers and cargo as shown in 
Figure 4.4. 
 SME’s then provide the probability of successfully on
based on the extremes of the controlling nodes.  If a 
controlling nodes the SMEs need to provide 
the response will be to the dependent node.
unique combination of values for the controlling nodes.
the dependent node loading Cargo/Pa
SMEs have to provide at least
the most likely probability of success for loading the cargo and passengers is 0.97 given 
there are 0 passengers and 10 tons of cargo.  
likely probability of success is 0.90 given there are 92 passengers and 
and they provide a most likely
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Figure 4.4 ESM Example 
-loading cargo and passengers 
dependent node is dependent on 
at least (n+1) scores to fully describe what 
  Each of the scores should correspond to a 
  For the example in Figure 4.
ssengers is dependent on two nodes, therefore the 
 three probabilities.  For this example, the SMEs determine 
Similarly, the SMEs determine the most 
20 tons of car
 probability of success of 0.93 given 0 passengers and 20 
 
n 
4, 
go 
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tons of cargo.  The SMEs also provide an upper and lower bound around the score they 
provide.  This creates the triangular pdf and represents the uncertainty they have in the 
score they provided.  These SME responses are depicted in Figure 4.5.   
 
 Figure 4.5 Most likely Probability value dependence on two controlling nodes 
The technique presented above results in the minimum data collection needed to 
complete the model.  More specifically, it requires (n+1) scores from the SMEs for each 
node where n is the number of controlling nodes.  By mandating that the probabilities 
provided by the SMEs are based on the extremes of the possible variable ranges of the 
controlling nodes, this model guarantees linear independence of the controlling node 
samples and prevents an underdetermined situation that would not result in a dependency 
equation.  However, the technique can be expanded to accept an increase in data points.  
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Instead of only looking at the extremes of the controlling node variables, SMEs can 
provide probabilities of success for points somewhere between the extremes of the 
independent variable range.  Additionally, for the same input variables multiple SMEs 
could provide differing probability of success that will all be taken into consideration 
when approximating the relationship in step 8. 
While obtaining more data points, care must still be taken to ensure the minimum 
requirements are met as to not create an underdetermined situation.  This can be 
accomplished by the scoring facilitator choosing the values of the controlling nodes that 
the SMEs will use to determine the score they assign. Any scores within the range of 
possible values of the controlling nodes can be selected.  The scoring facilitator needs 
only ensure the rank of the input variable matrix ", is equal to or greater than (n+1) 
where n is the number of controlling nodes.   The minimal method presented earlier 
ensured the rank equaled (n+1) by selecting the lowest value for all the variables, the 
highest value for all the variables, then a mix of highest and lowest until the minimum 
number of scores had been collected from the SMEs.  One way to guarantee the rank is 
great enough is to follow the minimal method presented above by selecting the extremes 
of the variable ranges.  Only after that method is accomplished the scoring facilitator can 
start choosing values for the controlling nodes that are somewhere in between the 
extremes.  This ensures the problem is over determined and a least squares fit can be 
accomplished to find the linear regression (Johnson, 1993: 207).   
Step 8: The relationship between the controlling nodes and the nodes they control 
is then approximated based on the input provided by the SMEs in step 7.  For the general 
case we are trying to find a linear approximation to the relationship that takes the form: 
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Where, #, is the probability of success for node i, X1, is the value of the first 
controlling node, X2 is the value of the second controlling node, and Xn is the value of the 
n
th
 controlling node.  The $ values are the equation parameters that control the weight or 
strength each controlling node has on the final probability where  $, is the nth parameter 
for the ith node. 
For the example shown in Figure 4.5, the relationship between probability of 
successfully on-loading cargo and passengers based on the quantities of passengers and 
cargo to be loaded is described by the equation: 
# 
 $,%  $,&  $,'&'                                         (7)     
Where X1 and X2 are the values of the controlling nodes (X1= Number of passengers, 
X2=tons of cargo).     
SME’s are asked to provide probability of success scores based on various values 
of the controlling nodes.  This yields a system of linear equations: 
,# 
 $,%  $,&,  $,'&',  (  $,&, ,'# 
 $,%  $,&,'  $,'&','  (  $,&,' ,)# 
 $,%  $,&,)  $,'&',)  (  $,&,) * ,+# 
 $,%  $,&,+  $,'&',+  (  $,&,+ 
 
Where ,+# is the ith node’s score for the mth trial while &,+ is the nth controlling 
node’s value for the mth trial. 
For the case where exactly (n+1) scores have been provided by the SMEs to 
define a relationship between a dependent node and  n controlling nodes with  n  
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dependent relationships, the SME responses yield a system of (n+1) linear equations.  
The equations for the example in Figure 4.5 are: 
0.97 
 $,%  $,0  $,'10 
0.90 
 $,%  $,92  $,'20 
0.93 
 $,%  $,0  $,'20 
The values of $,%, $,and $,' that satisfy the equations need to be found.  A simple way 
to find these values is by using matrices where (Neter, 1996:227) 
1 
 20.970.900.933 
" 
 21 0 101 92 201 0 203 
4 
 2$%$$'3 
Then: 1 
  "4  
4 
  "561                                                          (8) 
The technique used to find the values of X and Y guarantees X will be a square matrix 
with linearly independent rows in ".  This allows us to perform equation 8 without 
concern whether X is invertible or that X and Y matrices will not multiply (Johnson, 
1993: 54,96). 
The example would produce: 
2$%$$'3 
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1 0 101 92 201 0 2038
5
20.970.900.933 
  2
1.010.00030.004 3 
We can now update Equation 7 for this node with: 
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9:;<;=>=?@ :A BCCD## 
 1.01  0.0003&  0.004&' 
This is scalable to any number of controlling nodes; however each new controlling node 
requires the SMEs provide another probability of success relationship.  
To handle the situation where the SMEs provide some number of scores greater 
than (n+1), a linear regression is computed using the same least squares technique above 
however using the generalized equation.  Once the matrices of 1 and " are developed, 
the equation parameters, 4 must be found such that E1  "4E is minimized.  Equation 8, 
which is presented again below, was used in the minimal data point method to find the 
equation parameters, 4.  This equation cannot be used for the over-constrained case with 
greater data points because we cannot guarantee that X is square or invertible.  This 
causes equation 8 to be undefined.  Therefore, the pseudo inverse is used to find the 
generalized equation for 4  presented as equation 9 (Neter, 1996:227). 
4 
  "561 
4 
 "F"56"F1                                                  (9) 
As mentioned above, because the expanded data collection method allows for a 
large number of SME scores, the CRRA practitioner can also decide to have multiple 
SMEs determine their own scores.  Different SMEs will undoubtedly provide slightly 
different probability scores given the same group of input.  This method creates a best fit 
relationship thus aggregating their inputs to arrive at a single linear model.  
 It might be decided in future iterations of the CRRA that obtaining multiple data 
points from many SMEs is more desirable than the current method of getting consensus 
on one score.  This could prevent a group think mentality where an inaccurate score is 
presented based on the dynamics and pressures within the group.  Another benefit to 
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using this expanded method is it can be less time consuming than getting agreement on a 
minimal set of scores from many people.  Additionally, more data points could be 
acquired from individuals who are not able to attend the scoring session in person.  It is 
possible that tens or even hundreds of individuals across the Air Force, from Airmen 
working on the flight line to Wing Commanders, could provide their perspective on a 
node they have experience with to provide a more complete understanding of the 
dependency relationships.   
The example above shown in Figure 4.5, was used to find the ‘most likely’ or 
mode of the pdf for on-loading the passengers and cargo.  To complete the triangular pdf, 
an upper and lower bound must be determined.  The technique of approximating a linear 
relationship could be repeated two additional times to find the response on the highest 
and lowest bounds based on controlling node values.  This would allow the width of the 
triangular distribution to change based on the controlling variables; however, this would 
also require additional input from SMEs and additional calculations to execute the model 
which requires additional resources to complete the analysis.  Therefore, assuming the 
bounds of the probability density function respond identical to the ‘most likely’ value is 
appropriate.  The SMEs would determine an upper and lower bound around the highest 
possible value for the mode.  The width of that range would stay constant as the most 
likely value shifts.   In the example of Figure 4.5, the SMEs determined 0 passengers and 
10 tons of cargo would result in a most likely probability of success of 0.97.  The SMEs 
would then provide an upper and lower bound.  If the SMEs determined the bounds were 
0.95 and 0.99, then as other combinations of input variables creates different most likely 
probability distributions the upper and lower bounds would remain 0.02 above and below 
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the mode.  For example, if there were 45 passengers and 13 tons of cargo the model 
would produce a most likely probability of 0.945.  The lower bound would be 0.965 and 
the upper bound would be 0.925.  
Step 9: Similar to the current PSM approach, a Monte Carlo analysis is 
performed.  It starts by selecting a value for all independent nodes from the triangular 
distributions provided.  In the generic model presented in Figure 4.6, values are selected 
for nodes 3, 5, and 6.  Once the values are selected the probability distributions are 
defined for nodes influence by those outcomes.  The probability density function for node 
2 and node 4 would be found based on the outcome of nodes 5 and 6 respectively.  At 
that point, the simulation selects values for those nodes whose probability distribution has 
been calculated (nodes 2 and 4 below).   
This continues to roll up until all non-controlling nodes (nodes 1, 2, and 3) have a 
value selected.  Non-controlling nodes must have a measurement variable of probability 
of success; therefore, the overall probability of success for the mission is found by 
evaluating the probabilities of the non-controlling nodes.  If the nodes are presented in a 
series, all nodes must be successful for the entire mission to complete successfully.  To 
find the total probability, the probabilities of the nodes are simply multiplied to find the 
total system probability; however, it is also possible to include redundant nodes.  In this 
case, the total probability would be calculated using equation 2 and equation 3. Shown 
again here: 
	 
      
	 
 1  ∏ 1       (10)           
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Non-controlling nodes in an ESM don’t necessarily have to be arranged as a process.  
This is because each of the non-controlling nodes could represent an activity that is 
ongoing throughout the course of the evaluation period.  Either solid lines or branched 
lines are drawn between the non-controlling nodes to represent whether the total 
reliability is calculated using the series approach of multiplying all the probabilities or 
calculated as redundant nodes using equation 10.  Both types of non-controlling node 
connectors can be seen in Appendix A.  The example in Figure 4.6 shows a series 
configuration.    
Additionally, the diamond shaped decision nodes are handled in the same way as 
the current PSM method as explained in equation 4, although in this method they are not 
called decision nodes.  For use in PSMs, as well as ESMs, the decision nodes rarely 
represent decisions; they more often represent the percent of time various nodes are 
involved or not based on the conditions of the scenario.  The diamond shaped nodes 
determine how often a node is active.  Therefore, they have been renamed Activating 
nodes as they activate other nodes some fraction of the time.  The final probability 
equation for Figure 4.6 is: 
	 
 GH:'  GID#)J   (11) 
 
 
 Figure 4.
Step 10:  Section 2.3 
PSMs to determine which activities’ outcomes have the greatest impact on the overall 
mission probability, and ultimately the mission 
step, possibly more important than finding overall mission probability, because it assists 
with deciding what areas need additional resources in the future. The current method 
accomplishes this sensitivity analysis using two methods, availability and incremental.  
ESMs accomplish these two analyses in the same way.  
To accomplish the availability method, all nodes are kept at their most likely 
value except for the node under examination.  If the node has a measurement variable of 
probability of success its score is increased b
value and 1.0.   This is identical to the current technique
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6 ESM Generic Example 
described the sensitivity analyses that are performed
consequence and risk.  This is a crucial 
 
y half the difference between its most likely 
 (FAT, 2008).  If the 
 
 on 
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measurement variable is not probability of success, the measurement variable is evaluated 
at its least value and its greatest value to determine the difference in overall risk. 
  The incremental technique is accomplished identically to the current technique.  
The equation that describes the probability of success for the entire mission is identified, 
and partial derivatives of that equation with respect to individual nodes, are used to 
determine which node has the greatest associated sensitivity.  It was presented in equation 
11 above that the overall probability of the model in Figure 4.6 is: 
	 
 GH:'  GID#)J 
We can further expand this equation by recognizing that  
 
 $,%  $,KK  $,LL 
K 
 $K,%  $K,MM 
' 
 $',%  $',LL 
Where N and R represent the equation parameters for the other two nodes. 
Inserting all of these into equation 11 results in: 
	 
 $,%  $,K$K,%  $K,MM  $,LLANo $',%  $',LL  
 AYesP3S 
This equation shows the relationship of the total probability of success based on 
the outcome of the lowest level nodes.  Each partial derivative may be found with respect 
to each node.  The node whose partial derivative has the greatest magnitude is the driving 
node.  While this example shows the sensitivity analysis done at the lowest level it could 
be accomplished at any level.  For example, the sensitivity analysis could have been 
accomplished at the top level represented by the equation 11 to determine which of the 
top level nodes have the greatest influence on the outcome. 
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4.4  ESM Assumptions 
In addition to assuming a linear relationship between controlling and non-
controlling nodes, the ESM method also assumes that the only dependencies between 
nodes are the ones presented in the model; the nodes are independent from each other in 
all other ways.  The current method assumes all nodes are independent from each other.  
As explained earlier, with some careful thought dependencies can be found between 
many nodes; this new method allows the CRRA practitioner to identify the dependencies 
that could be important to the analysis and examine them while continuing to assume 
independence with other nodes.   
ESMs assume that the dependency relationships can be modeled as linear.  In 
reality, the relationship between two variables might not be linear.  By making this 
assumption, ESMs attempt to identify a first order approximation and builds on the 
current PSMs that don’t allow any dependencies.   
It is important to recognize this model does not explicitly show a process, even if 
the activities in the ESM are accomplished within a process.  It shows the activities that 
must be completed to successfully complete the mission as well as factors dependent on 
those activities.  Some or all of these activities might occur simultaneously or they might 
not.  The ordering of some activities can be inferred when the performance of an activity 
is dependent on the outcome of another discrete activity.  This is a byproduct of showing 
dependencies.  Therefore, in missions where there are discrete activities accomplished in 
a process and timing information is of importance to the CRRA practitioner, it would be 
important to construct the ESM to show the ordered accomplishment of activities while 
also showing the dependency relationships activities have on each other.  Even in such a 
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case the probability of success of activities can still be related to environmental factors 
using the techniques described in this new method without any change to the technique 
described.  
Another assumption is that the only effect controlling nodes have on the overall 
probability of success is indirectly through their influence on the non-controlling nodes.  
This assumption is valid because in the case a controlling node does directly impact the 
probability of success of the overall mission, a new non-controlling node can be added 
that is dependent on the controlling node in question and captures the direct influence that 
was identified.  In the example of Figure 4.4, the tonnage of cargo impacted the 
probability of successfully loading the cargo and passengers in a timely manner.  If it is 
decided that the tonnage of cargo also has a direct affect on the overall probability of 
success of the mission, e.g. the lower the tonnage the less likely the mission will succeed, 
then a new non-controlling node could be added called Enough cargo to complete the 
mission, and its probability of success can be linked to the tonnage of cargo controlling 
node.  This way, while the tonnage drops and increases the probability of loading the 
cargo and passengers, it decreases the probability of having enough cargo to complete the 
mission. 
4.5 Verification of the Model 
For the purpose of gaining a better understanding of how this model and its 
supporting method would be implemented, a test of the model was conducted.  A small 
portion of the 2009 ACS Homestation Readiness PSM was selected for the test.  A 
review of this PSM resulted in the identification of several nodes that lent themselves to 
the exploration of how sufficiency or quantity can be captured and dependencies shown.  
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The nodes selected were Identifying Surge Requirements (3.01), Recall Selected/Ready 
Reserve (3.03), and Recall Standby/Retired Reserve/IRR (3.05).  It was decided that 
determining how many Airmen are needed and how many Airmen are obtained through 
the reserves could shed more light on the probability of completing the mission than 
simply identifying the likelihood of successfully identifying the number of Airmen 
required and the likelihood of successfully filling that number.   
The logic of the current PSM method broke down when applied to the Recall 
Standby/Retired Reserve.  The current method calls for each node to be scored as if all 
previous nodes were successful.  If that is the case, then there would be no need to Recall 
Standby/Retired Reserve because the previous node Recall Selected/Ready Reserve 
would have already provided all required Airmen.  Obviously there are important 
dependencies between these nodes that are not captured in the current PSM models.  
Additionally, the percent of the required surge that gets filled can affect the successful 
completion of nodes that require the use of those reservists.  For all of these reasons, 
these nodes lent themselves to being evaluated with the proposed ESMs.  Nodes were 
selected to show how the quantity of Airmen recalled will affect the overall probability of 
success.  The nodes selected for this were from the Flying Training Block, Generate 
Training Mission (8.02), Undergraduate Flying Training (8.03), Graduate Flying 
Training (8.04), Mission Flying Training (8.05), and Flying Deployment Training (8.06).  
Next, it was decided that showing the use of the activation node would be beneficial.  
Therefore, Acquire Material? (5.05) and the node it activates Obtain Material (5.06) 
were included in the model.  Lastly, ESMs can take into consideration environmental 
factors that might have an impact on the overall probability of success; this allows the 
 CRRA practitioner to evaluate 
provide an example of this new
included.   The resulting model
Figure 4.7 Model Verification
A function node was used to handle the relationships between surge requirements and 
reserves recalled.  The non-controlling nodes are dependent on the percent of the surge 
requirement filled.  If the surge requirement is less than th
obtained through both forms of reserves, the percentage is 100% filled.  If the surge 
requirement is greater than the number of people that can be supplied from the reserves
the percent filled is calculated and used to contr
controlling nodes. 
 With the model framework established, 
the nodes.  It should be emphasized the
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the importance of those environmental factors
 feature, the Force Protection Condition (FPCON) is 
 is shown in Figure 4.7. 
 of a segment of ACS ESM 
e number of people that can be 
ol the probability of success of 
two mock SMEs were selected to score 
se SMEs were not actually experts in the areas 
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they scored.  The scores presented are notional and in no way should be considered 
indicative of actual Air Force capability or deficiency.  A scenario was presented to the 
SMEs and a series of questions were asked to obtain scores for the model.   Their answers 
were then input to a computer program developed in MATLAB® during this research to 
generate the overall probability of successfully completing all of the non-controlling 
nodes and the sensitivity each node has on the overall probability of success.  The 
MATLAB® code is presented in Appendix B.  The complete lists of questions asked of 
the SMEs and the answers they provided are presented in Appendix C.  A sample of the 
questions and answers is presented below. 
Table 4.2. SME questions and responses 
Identify Surge Requirements  (reported in numbers of people) 
Given the scenario, what is the lowest likely number of surge 
personnel required?  20 
Given the scenario, what is the most likely number of surge 
personnel required?  
60 
Given the scenario, what is the largest likely number of surge 
personnel required?  
80 
Recall Ready Reserve  (reported in numbers of people) 
Given the scenario, what is the lower limit on the expected 
number of Ready Reserve that can be recalled? 0 
Given the scenario, what is the expected number of Ready 
Reserve that can be recalled?  
30 
Given the scenario, what is the upper limit on the expected 
number of Ready Reserve that can be recalled?  40 
Recall Standby/Retired Reserve  (reported in numbers of people) 
Given the scenario, what is the lower limit on the expected 
number of Standby/Retired Reserve that can be recalled? 0 
Given the scenario, what is the expected number of 
Standby/Retired Reserve that can be recalled? 2 
Given the scenario, what is the upper limit on the expected 
number of Standby/Retired Reserve that can be recalled? 5 
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Based on the input from the SMEs, triangular probability density functions (pdfs) 
were established and 10,000 samples were taken from each.  10,000 samples were taken 
to consistently provided samples across the entire range of possible inputs.  For example, 
because of the low probability of obtaining samples of 20 or 80 in the Required Surge 
Distribution presented in Table 4.2, less than 10,000 runs would consistently produce 
sample sets that never include 20 or 80.  The number of runs will have to change for 
future applications of this method to ensure the full range of possible inputs is 
represented.  Histograms of the values of each of the samples are presented in Figures 
4.8, 4.9, and 4.10. 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Required Surge Distribution 
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Figure 4.9 Ready Reserve Distribution 
 
Figure 4.10 Retired Reserve Distribution 
The sample values presented above were used to find the percent of the requirement filled 
for each sample group.  The result is presented in Figure 4.11. 
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Figure 4.11 Percent of Surge Filled 
 
Figure 4.11 shows that the vast majority of runs (approximately 9,600 of the 
10,000 runs) produced less than 100% of the required surge.  This is true even though 
more runs equaled 100% than any other single percentage.  This can be seen by the large 
bar located at 100 in Figure 4.11.  The reason so many more runs resulted in 100% is that 
for all situations where the number of people required for the surge was less than the 
number of reservists that could be recalled the percentage was assigned 100%.  Without 
this rule, Figure 4.11 would have values that extend beyond the 100% mark.  Being able 
to recall more than what is required is not important to the effects on the dependent nodes 
because it was assumed only the number of reservists required would actually be recalled.  
Therefore, the ability to recall more than the number required represents 100% of the 
required number recalled. 
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The relationships between each of the non-controlling nodes and the percent of 
surge filled and FPCON were found by asking the SMEs to score each non-controlling 
node based on the different values of the controlling nodes.  The SMEs also provided the 
bounded range on the pdf for each non-controlling node.  The bounded range presents the 
SMEs uncertainty of the P(S) they provided.  A sample of the questions asked and the 
SME answers are presented in Table 4.3.   The complete questions and answers are 
presented in Appendix C. 
Table 4.3 SME dependency questions and responses 
Generate Training Mission 
What is the probability of Successfully completing 'Generate Training 
Mission' based on the FPCON and % surge filled provided? 
FPCON % surge filled P(Success) "+/-" 
ALPHA(1) 100 0.96 0.03 
ALPHA(1) 0 0.65   
DELTA(4) 0 0.7   
 
Undergraduate Flying Training 
What is the probability of Successfully completing 'Undergraduate 
Flying Training' based on the FPCON and % surge filled provided? 
FPCON % surge filled P(Success) "+/-" 
ALPHA(1) 100 0.98 0.03 
ALPHA(1) 0 0.6   
DELTA(4) 0 0.5   
 
Mission Flying Training 
What is the probability of Successfully completing 'Mission Flying 
Training' based on the FPCON and % surge filled provided? 
FPCON % surge filled P(Success) "+/-" 
ALPHA(1) 100 0.99 0.03 
ALPHA(1) 0 0.7   
DELTA(4) 0 0.6   
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The inputs listed in the table 4.3 were used to approximate linear dependency 
relationships between all of the non-controlling and controlling nodes. The equations 
describing each of those relationships are presented below. 
Generate Training Mission = 0.6333 + 0.0167(FPCON) + 0.31(Percent Surge Filled) 
Obtain Training Material = 0.9333 – 0.0833(FPCON) + 0.15(Percent Surge Filled) 
UFT = 0.633 – 0.0333(FPCON) + 0.38(Percent Surge Filled) 
GFT = 0.633 - 0.0333 (FPCON) + 0.38(Percent Surge Filled) 
MFT = 0.733 - 0.0333 (FPCON) + 0.29(Percent Surge Filled) 
FDT = 0.7833 - 0.0333 (FPCON) + 0.24(Percent Surge Filled) 
 
The percent of the surge filled values computed above were combined with the 
FPCON levels to find the overall probability of success for the entire model.  For this 
example, the equation to find the overall probability of success is the product of all non-
controlling nodes with Obtain Training Material weighted to reflect how often it is 
activated.  The resulting distribution reveals the most likely probability of success of the 
activities in this scenario is approximately 20% as presented in Figure 4.12. 
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Figure 4.12 Overall Probability of Success Distribution 
Next, a sensitivity analysis was conducted to determine the affect each node has 
on the outcome of the overall probability.  The sensitivity analysis used was the 
availability method explained in Section 4.3.  The result of the sensitivity analysis is 
shown in Figure 4.13.  The node that has the most affect on the overall probability is the 
Surge Required Node followed by the Ready Reserve Node.  For this example the node 
that was shown to most affect the overall probability turned out to be a node outside of 
the control of the Air Force.  The surge required is largely dictated by the scenario.  This 
does not suggest that it is not important to consider.  Understanding what the leading 
drivers of the system are even when they are outside the control of the system lends itself 
to solutions that don’t rely so strongly on that external factor.  For example, if an analysis 
is conducted that shows the weather conditions are a significant factor in the successful 
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completion of the mission, it could point toward developing systems that can more 
reliability work in all weather situations.   
 
Figure 4.13 Sensitivity Analysis Results 
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5. Conclusion 
5.1 Overview 
The Air Force has established an analysis method for evaluating the capabilities it 
is expected to provide to the Joint-warfighter.  It does this by combining the insights of 
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) with a framework represented in Process Sequence 
Models (PSMs) to determine which capabilities cause the Air Force the greatest degree of 
risk.  Ultimately, resource allocation decisions are made based on this evaluation. Over 
the last six years the Capability Review and Risk Assessment (CRRA) has gone through 
several iterations. Each iteration brought with it changes that were intended to uncover 
more information relevant to Air Force performance and increase the validity and 
repeatability of the process.  The current CRRA method has come a long way since its 
inception but remains constrained by simplifying assumptions on the models that limit its 
insight into the problem under examination while creating avenues for critics to question 
the validity of its output.  As this research pointed out, the most limiting assumptions 
made are: 
• Each activity in a PSM can have only two states; success or failure. 
• The degree by which an activity succeeds or fails has no impact on the 
overall mission completion.  
• Each activity is evaluated assuming all other activities in the PSM were 
successful, thereby assuming independence in the scores.   
Consequences of these assumptions are that the effect of capability quantity or 
sufficiency is not considered and there is no representation of dependencies or how 
dependencies can affect mission completion. 
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The method of Extended Sequence Modeling has been presented that relaxes 
these assumptions.  ESMs allow CRRA practitioners to examine the dependent 
relationships of the system and discover how changes in dependent activities can ripple 
through a system to affect the overall outcome.  Additionally, Air Force planners can now 
explore how the quantity of a capability or how well it is accomplished can impact 
mission success.  It does this by empowering the CRRA practitioner with the ability to 
choose which dependencies are of interest to examine and which capabilities or activities 
are better modeled using a graduated scale of sufficiency rather than probability of 
success.  It then uses input from SMEs to determine the strength of the dependency each 
of the dependent nodes have with their controlling nodes.  This SME input combined 
with the techniques of reliability analysis and linear regression establishes linear 
relationships between the dependent and controlling nodes.   
One of the strengths of this new method is it can be added to the existing PSMs.  
If the CRRA practitioner wishes to keep the current modeling technique intact but is still 
curious of a node’s dependency on a particular controlling variable, the probability 
density function of that one node can be established using the techniques of ESMs while 
leaving the rest of the PSM unchanged.  Additionally, ESMs can be used to stretch across 
traditional CONOPS lines.  For example, the outcome of Agile Combat Support 
Activities can be linked to activities within operational CONOPS models.  Therefore, 
when a sensitivity analysis is performed, it could result in evidence for the importance of 
the supporting functions.  As is the case with all models, this new model also makes 
simplifying assumptions, albeit somewhat less restrictive ones than the current model.  
The most significant assumptions are that linear relationships exist between dependent 
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and controlling nodes and that all nodes not specifically shown to be dependent in the 
model are independent. 
While this method was presented to show the minimum amount of information 
required from the SME, it was also shown that the method can be expanded.  By 
accepting additional information from SMEs it is possible to arrive at a more accurate 
representation of the dependency relationships.  Also, the expanded technique can avoid 
the potential for group think that can exist when a group of SMEs are forced to come to a 
consensus.  This model formulation can easily fit a linear relationship to large numbers of 
SMEs, each contributing their own assessments of dependencies.   
The Air Force is a large, complicated organization.  Modeling its performance 
entails understanding its various components, how they interact with each other, to 
include the rules they follow and are constrained by, and how these factors change 
through time.  It is exactly this sort of system that allows the benefits of Enterprise 
Architecture to be fully appreciated.  To get the full benefits from architecture there are a 
few considerations that must be made.  The first is the architecture should be able to 
contain all information that is relevant to the processes and people who use it.  This does 
more than merely save people the hassle of jumping from one program to another to view 
all information they need.  By having all information in one repository it allows 
relationships to be discovered and established which creates additional benefits, some of 
which were described in Chapter 4.  Additionally, while architecture with a robust meta 
model to handle a wide variety of information types is essential, the presentation of that 
information needs to be adjustable.  Many different people use architecture for different 
purposes.  The user needs to be able to generate views, models, or other types of reports 
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that are in agreement with their purposes.  In order to contain all of the required 
information it is likely the architecture itself would have to be maintained at a classified 
level.  For example, for an Air Force Enterprise Architecture to fully support the CRRA, 
it would have to capture the scores provided by SMEs.  These scores are classified and 
therefore the architecture would need to be classified.   
The Air Force’s Office of Warfighting Integration and Chief Information Officer 
(SAF/XC) has developed guidelines that allow architectures that are built throughout the 
Air Force to be “Fit for Federation”.  This means all architectures, whether they are for 
systems, organizations, or services can be interfaced with higher level architectures.  
Through these defined interfaces a user can start at a top level architecture and query, 
search, or explore down into all of the architectures that are federated to it.  The power of 
this technique can be appreciated when viewed in application to the CRRA.  Chapter 4 
explored using an SV-5 and SV-7 to support the CRRA.  Within a federated architecture, 
the architecture could be queried to produce an SV-5 and SV-7 of all systems or even 
organizations that provide a designated capability and the performance of that system.   
With respect to the model used for the CRRA analysis, benefits of enterprise 
architecture can be seen in two overarching ways.  The first is assisting the construction 
and scoring of the model to be evaluated.  The Air Force architecture can contain 
information that can be reused for many different purposes including the CRRA.  By 
pulling information from the architecture, models can be constructed that represent the 
parts of the Air Force to be studied by the CRRA.  As already highlighted, the Draft 
DoDAF 2.0 contains new viewpoints that can be used to assist with the CRRA. The 
second benefit of enterprise architecture is its ability to capture the model used for the 
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evaluation and store it in the architecture to be used for future CRRA analysis or for other 
unforeseen purposes.   
5.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
The following items are suggested for further study. 
1) Once DoDAF version 2.0 becomes final, a thorough analysis should be 
conducted to understand how its expanded viewpoints and data model can 
assist the CRRA.  Likewise, recommendations to add ESM to future 
DoDAF versions could begin. 
2) Investigate a way to accurately assess the PAARs and implement a 
process to further research areas where additional risk may be accepted. 
3)  The CRRA is performed within each CONOP with limited connection 
between the CONOPs.  Although the effects of a mission area in one 
CONOP on another CONOP is starting to be examined, there still exists 
disconnects.  Research can be performed to determine how best to align 
the various missions under scrutiny within the CRRA.  A study should be 
undertaken on how the ESM, and other techniques, can be used to 
combine the effects of multiple CONOPs.  This concept could support the 
mathematical analysis of an integrated CRRA across CONOPs. 
4)  One concern from a CRRA practitioner was the lack of a technique to 
determine which shortfalls across the multiple CONOPS should be the 
highest priority.  AF/A5X-C has started to address this issue.  It would be 
beneficial to research a method for assessing shortfall priority across 
various CONOPs. 
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5) A study should examine the effects to opening up the CRRA to many 
more scoring SMEs for the purpose of getting more points of view. 
6) This ESM approach uses linear relationships.  The modeling of ESM 
dependencies using non-linear relationships could be examined.   
7) Currently the final PSM result is a probability of success score that is 
related to a consequence by the combatant commands.  It is a natural 
extension of this research to show how other variables other than 
probability of success can be linked to consequences.   Through this, 
sufficiency of a capability can be linked to consequence similar to this 
research’s aim to link sufficiency of a capability to probability of success. 
8) Future work could study the statistical properties of the SME input data 
when finding the dependency relationships for the ESM method to 
determine if such information can be of use in the analysis.  For example, 
the standard deviation of their scores might reveal information about the 
nature of dependent relationships or the uncertainty associated with those 
relationships. 
9) Implementation of the ESM method should be demonstrated for 
distributions other than triangular.  The behavior of normal distributions 
undergoing linear transformations is well understood (they remain 
normal), but other distributions may be necessary for cases where hard 
constraints bound possible values.   
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Appendix A.  Icon Taxonomy 
 
 
The pdf for the node at the head of the arrow is 
linearly dependent on the variable of the node 
at the tail of the arrow. 
Data 
 
The value of the variable for the node at the 
tail of the arrow is input to the node at the 
heard of the arrow – can only feed to a 
function node. 
 
 
Connects non-controlling nodes in series.
 
 
Tail is always linked to activation node, head 
is always linked to a non-controlling node.  It 
shows which non-controlling Node is activated 
by the Activation Node. 
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Has a dependent variable that is determined by 
the input variable(s) and the function logic
* Must have one or more inputs 
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   Dependency Relationship 
Non-
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Variable must be P(s).  Directly impacts the 
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Appendix B.  MATLAB Code 
 
%Written by Peter Mastro 28 January 2009 
%Calculates overall probability of success for the sample model 
presented 
%to our thesis advisors on 27 January 2009, for the purpose of 
validating 
%the modeling method 
  
clear %clears all variables 
runs=10000; %sets the number of samples that will be taken of each 
variable 
disp('This program will calculate the overall probability of success of 
the mission presented to the Advisors on Jan 27') 
  
%The following block receives the bounds for the expected surge 
requirement 
%, builds the triangular distribution and picks random values from it 
lowest_req=input('Enter the lowest expected surge requirement:  '); 
most_req=input('Enter the most likely surge requirement:  '); 
highest_req=input('Enter the highest likely surge requirement:  '); 
  
a = lowest_req; 
b = highest_req; 
c = most_req; 
u = rand(runs,1); %selects random numbers 
lo = (u<=((c-a)/(b-a))); %determines all random numbers that are less 
than the mode 
req(lo) =  a + sqrt(u(lo).*((b-a)*(c-a))); %uses the inversion method 
with the random numbers to generate triangular dist. 
req(~lo) = b - sqrt((1-u(~lo)).*(b-a)*(b-c)); 
req=round(req);%rounds to the nearest whole number since we are dealing 
with people 
hist(req,((b-a)+1))%displays histogram that has the same number of bins 
as there are number of different possible amounts 
xlabel('Number of People Required for the Surge','FontSize',12) 
ylabel('Frequency number was selected','FontSize',12) 
title('Required Surge Distribution','FontSize',16) 
disp('  ') 
  
%The following block receives the bounds for the expected ready reserve 
%, builds the triangular distribution and picks random values from it 
lowest_redres=input('Enter the lower limit on expected Ready Reserve to 
be recalled:  '); 
most_redres=input('Enter the most likely number of Ready Reserve to be 
recalled:  '); 
highest_redres=input('Enter the upper limit on expected Ready Reserve 
to be recalled: '); 
  
a = lowest_redres; 
b = highest_redres; 
c = most_redres; 
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u = rand(runs,1);%selects random numbers 
lo = (u<((c-a)/(b-a)));%determines all random numbers that are less 
than the mode 
redres(lo) =  a + sqrt(u(lo).*((b-a)*(c-a)));%uses the inversion method 
with the random numbers to generate triangular dist. 
redres(~lo) = b - sqrt((1-u(~lo)).*(b-a)*(b-c)); 
redres=round(redres);%rounds to the nearest whole number since we are 
dealing with people 
hist(redres,((b-a)+1))%displays histogram that has the same number of 
bins as there are number of different possible amounts 
xlabel('Number of People received from the Ready 
Reserve','FontSize',12) 
ylabel('Frequency number was selected','FontSize',12) 
title('Ready Reserve','FontSize',16) 
disp('  ') 
  
%The following block receives the bounds for the expected retired 
reserve 
%, builds the triangular distribution and picks random values from it 
lowest_retres=input('Enter the lower limit on expected Retired Reserve 
to be recalled:  '); 
most_retres=input('Enter the most likely number of Retired Reserve to 
be recalled:  '); 
highest_retres=input('Enter the upper limit on expected Retired Reserve 
to be recalled: '); 
  
a = lowest_retres; 
b = highest_retres; 
c = most_retres; 
u = rand(runs,1);%selects random numbers 
lo = (u<((c-a)/(b-a)));%determines all random numbers that are less 
than the mode 
retres(lo) =  a + sqrt(u(lo).*((b-a)*(c-a)));%uses the inversion method 
with the random numbers to generate triangular dist. 
retres(~lo) = b - sqrt((1-u(~lo)).*(b-a)*(b-c)); 
retres=round(retres);%rounds to the nearest whole number since we are 
dealing with people 
hist(retres,((b-a)+1))%displays histogram that has the same number of 
bins as there are number of different possible amounts 
xlabel('Number of People received from Retired Reserve','FontSize',12) 
ylabel('Frequency number was selected','FontSize',12) 
title('Retired Reserve','FontSize',16) 
disp('  ') 
result=input('press return when ready'); 
  
%The following block takes the random numbers previously generated and 
%calculates the percent of the required surge that is met by the ready 
and 
%retired reserves, then displays a histogram of the information. 
for n=1:runs 
if (req(n)<=(redres(n)+retres(n))) 
    percent_fill(n)=1; %if there are more people than required it 
reports 100% 
else 
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    percent_fill(n)= ((redres(n)+retres(n))/req(n));% if there are less 
people than required this finds the percent filled 
end 
end 
hist(percent_fill,100)% displays histogram 
xlabel('Percent of the Surge Filled','FontSize',12) %label for 
histogram 
ylabel('Frequency percentage was computed','FontSize',12) %label for 
histogram 
title('Percent of Surge Filled','FontSize',16) %title for histogram 
  disp('  ') 
  
%This receives the FPCON information then develops an array with the 
same number of  
%each level as inputed by the percentage inputted by the user 
FPCON_Alpha=input('What is the probability the base will be at FPCON 
Alpha? '); 
FPCON_Bravo=input('What is the probability the base will be at FPCON 
Bravo? '); 
FPCON_Charlie=input('What is the probability the base will be at FPCON 
Charlie? '); 
FPCON_Delta=input('What is the probability the base will be at FPCON 
Delta? '); 
  
c=1; 
for n=1:round(runs*FPCON_Alpha) 
FPCON(c)=1; %fills an array to the appropriate percentage with 1 which 
stands for Alpha  
c=c+1; 
end 
for n=1:round(runs*FPCON_Bravo) 
    c=c+1; 
    FPCON(c)=2;%fills an array to the appropriate percentage with 2 
which stands for Bravo 
end 
for n=1:round(runs*FPCON_Charlie) 
    c=c+1; 
    FPCON(c)=3;%fills an array to the appropriate percentage with 3 
which stands for Charle 
end 
for n=1:round(runs*FPCON_Delta) 
    c=c+1; 
    FPCON(c)=4;%fills an array to the appropriate percentage with 4 
which stands for Delta 
end 
hist(FPCON,100)% shows the histogram of the FPCONS 
xlabel('FPCON levels','FontSize',12)%label for histogram 
ylabel('Frequency level was selected','FontSize',12)%label for 
histogram 
title('FPCON level distribution','FontSize',16) 
disp('  ') 
  
%gets the probability obtain materials will be calculated in the final 
%calculation 
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Acquire_mat=input('What is the probability additional training 
materials will be required? '); 
  
%The next block gets the probability of success for the non-controlling 
%nodes from the user 
if (lowest_req<(highest_redres+highest_retres)) 
greatest_percent_filled=1; 
else 
    
greatest_percent_filled=((highest_redres+highest_retres)/lowest_req); 
end 
  
if (highest_req<(lowest_redres+lowest_retres)) 
lowest_percent_filled=1; 
else 
    lowest_percent_filled=((lowest_redres+lowest_retres)/highest_req); 
end 
disp(' ') 
disp('For Generate Training Mission: ') 
disp('If the FPCON is Alpha and the % surge filled is')  
disp(greatest_percent_filled*100) 
Gen_Miss(1)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
disp(' ') 
disp('If the FPCON is Alpha and the % surge filled is')  
disp(lowest_percent_filled*100) 
Gen_Miss(2)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
disp(' ') 
disp('If the FPCON is Delta and the % surge filled is')  
disp(lowest_percent_filled*100) 
Gen_Miss(3)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
GenMissRange=input('What is the "+/-" of the probability range? '); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
disp(' ') 
disp('For Obtain Training Material: ') 
disp('If the FPCON is Alpha and the % surge filled is')  
disp(greatest_percent_filled*100) 
ob_Mat(1)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
disp(' ') 
disp('If the FPCON is Alpha and the % surge filled is')  
disp(lowest_percent_filled*100) 
ob_Mat(2)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
disp(' ') 
disp('If the FPCON is Delta and the % surge filled is')  
disp(lowest_percent_filled*100) 
ob_Mat(3)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
obMatRange=input('What is the "+/-" of the probability range? '); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
disp(' ') 
disp('For Undergraduate Flying Training: ') 
disp('If the FPCON is Alpha and the % surge filled is')  
disp(greatest_percent_filled*100) 
UFT(1)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
disp(' ') 
disp('If the FPCON is Alpha and the % surge filled is')  
disp(lowest_percent_filled*100) 
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UFT(2)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
disp(' ') 
disp('If the FPCON is Delta and the % surge filled is')  
disp(lowest_percent_filled*100) 
UFT(3)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
UFTRange=input('What is the "+/-" of the probability range? '); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
disp(' ') 
disp('For Graduate Flying Training: ') 
disp('If the FPCON is Alpha and the % surge filled is') 
disp(greatest_percent_filled*100) 
GFT(1)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
  
disp('If the FPCON is Alpha and the % surge filled is')  
disp(lowest_percent_filled*100) 
GFT(2)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
  
disp('If the FPCON is Delta and the % surge filled is')  
disp(lowest_percent_filled*100) 
GFT(3)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
GFTRange=input('What is the "+/-" of the probability range? '); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
disp(' ') 
disp('For Mission Flying Training: ') 
disp('If the FPCON is Alpha and the % surge filled is' ) 
disp(greatest_percent_filled*100) 
MFT(1)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
disp(' ') 
disp('If the FPCON is Alpha and the % surge filled is' ) 
disp(lowest_percent_filled*100) 
MFT(2)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
disp(' ') 
disp('If the FPCON is Delta and the % surge filled is' ) 
disp(lowest_percent_filled*100) 
MFT(3)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
MFTRange=input('What is the "+/-" of the probability range? '); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
disp(' ') 
disp('For Flying Deployment Training: ') 
disp('If the FPCON is Alpha and the % surge filled is')  
disp(greatest_percent_filled*100) 
FDT(1)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
disp(' ') 
disp('If the FPCON is Alpha and the % surge filled is')  
disp(lowest_percent_filled*100) 
FDT(2)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
disp(' ') 
disp('If the FPCON is Delta and the % surge filled is')  
disp(lowest_percent_filled*100) 
FDT(3)=input('what is the probability of success? '); 
FDTRange=input('What is the "+/-" of the probability range? '); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
%The next block finds the parameters of the dependency equation for 
each of 
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%the non-controlling nodes 
x=[1,1,greatest_percent_filled;1,1,lowest_percent_filled;1,4,lowest_per
cent_filled];%builds the input variable matrix 
  
y=Gen_Miss'; 
GenMissB=((x'*x)^-1)*(x'*y); 
  
y=ob_Mat'; 
ob_MatB=((x'*x)^-1)*(x'*y); 
  
y=UFT'; 
UFTB=((x'*x)^-1)*(x'*y); 
  
y=GFT'; 
GFTB=((x'*x)^-1)*(x'*y); 
  
y=MFT'; 
MFTB=((x'*x)^-1)*(x'*y); 
  
y=FDT'; 
FDTB=((x'*x)^-1)*(x'*y); 
  
  
%This finds the mode of the pdf for each of the runs for each of 
%the non-controlling nodes 
for n=1:runs 
GenMissProbmode(n)=GenMissB(1)+GenMissB(2)*FPCON(n)+GenMissB(3)*percent
_fill(n); 
end 
  
for n=1:runs 
obMatProbmode(n)=ob_MatB(1)+ob_MatB(2)*FPCON(n)+ob_MatB(3)*percent_fill
(n); 
end 
  
for n=1:runs 
UFTProbmode(n)=UFTB(1)+UFTB(2)*FPCON(n)+UFTB(3)*percent_fill(n); 
end 
  
for n=1:runs 
GFTProbmode(n)=GFTB(1)+GFTB(2)*FPCON(n)+GFTB(3)*percent_fill(n); 
end 
  
for n=1:runs 
MFTProbmode(n)=MFTB(1)+MFTB(2)*FPCON(n)+MFTB(3)*percent_fill(n); 
end 
  
for n=1:runs 
FDTProbmode(n)=FDTB(1)+FDTB(2)*FPCON(n)+FDTB(3)*percent_fill(n); 
end 
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%The next block generates triangular distributions based on the modes 
generated above then picks a random number from the 
%distribution 
a = GenMissProbmode-GenMissRange; 
b = GenMissProbmode+GenMissRange; 
c = GenMissProbmode; 
u = rand(runs,1); %selects random number 
for n=1:runs 
if (u(n)<((c(n)-a(n))/(b(n)-a(n)))); 
GenMissProb(n)= a(n) + sqrt(u(n)*((b(n)-a(n))*(c(n)-a(n)))); 
if GenMissProb(n)>1 
    GenMissProb(n)=1; %if because of the Range the probability is 
greater than 1 it is assigned 1 
end 
if GenMissProb(n)<0 
    GenMissProb(n)=0; %if because of the Range the probability is less 
than 0 it is assigned 0 
end 
else 
GenMissProb(n) = b(n) - sqrt((1-u(n))*(b(n)-a(n))*(b(n)-c(n))); 
if GenMissProb(n)>1 
    GenMissProb(n)=1;%if because of the Range the probability is 
greater than 1 it is assigned 1 
end 
if GenMissProb(n)<0 
    GenMissProb(n)=0;%if because of the Range the probability is less 
than 0 it is assigned 0 
end 
end 
end 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
a = obMatProbmode-obMatRange; 
b = obMatProbmode+obMatRange; 
c = obMatProbmode; 
u = rand(runs,1);%selects random numbers 
for n=1:runs 
if (u(n)<((c(n)-a(n))/(b(n)-a(n)))); 
obMatProb(n)= a(n) + sqrt(u(n)*((b(n)-a(n))*(c(n)-a(n)))); 
if obMatProb(n)>1 
    obMatProb(n)=1;%if because of the Range the probability is greater 
than 1 it is assigned 1 
end 
if obMatProb(n)<0 
    obMatProb(n)=0;%if because of the Range the probability is less 
than 0 it is assigned 0 
end 
else 
obMatProb(n) = b(n) - sqrt((1-u(n))*(b(n)-a(n))*(b(n)-c(n))); 
if obMatProb(n)>1 
    obMatProb(n)=1;%if because of the Range the probability is greater 
than 1 it is assigned 1 
end 
if obMatProb(n)<0 
    obMatProb(n)=0;%if because of the Range the probability is less 
than 0 it is assigned 0 
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end 
end 
end 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
a = UFTProbmode-UFTRange; 
b = UFTProbmode+UFTRange; 
c = UFTProbmode; 
u = rand(runs,1);%selects random numbers 
for n=1:runs 
if (u(n)<((c(n)-a(n))/(b(n)-a(n)))); 
UFTProb(n)= a(n) + sqrt(u(n)*((b(n)-a(n))*(c(n)-a(n)))); 
if UFTProb(n)>1 
    UFTProb(n)=1;%if because of the Range the probability is greater 
than 1 it is assigned 1 
end 
if UFTProb(n)<0 
    UFTProb(n)=0;%if because of the Range the probability is less than 
0 it is assigned 0 
end 
else 
UFTProb(n) = b(n) - sqrt((1-u(n))*(b(n)-a(n))*(b(n)-c(n))); 
if UFTProb(n)>1 
    UFTProb(n)=1;%if because of the Range the probability is greater 
than 1 it is assigned 1 
end 
if UFTProb(n)<0 
    UFTProb(n)=0;%if because of the Range teh probability is less than 
0 it is assigned 0 
end 
end 
end 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
a = GFTProbmode-GFTRange; 
b = GFTProbmode+GFTRange; 
c = GFTProbmode; 
u = rand(runs,1);%selects random numbers 
for n=1:runs 
if (u(n)<((c(n)-a(n))/(b(n)-a(n)))); 
GFTProb(n)= a(n) + sqrt(u(n)*((b(n)-a(n))*(c(n)-a(n)))); 
if GFTProb(n)>1 
    GFTProb(n)=1;%if because of the Range the probability is greater 
than 1 it is assigned 1 
end 
if GFTProb(n)<0 
    GFTProb(n)=0;%if because of the Range the probability is less than 
0 it is assigned 0 
end 
else 
GFTProb(n) = b(n) - sqrt((1-u(n))*(b(n)-a(n))*(b(n)-c(n))); 
if GFTProb(n)>1 
    GFTProb(n)=1;%if because of the Range the probability is greater 
than 1 it is assigned 1 
end 
if GFTProb(n)<0 
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    GFTProb(n)=0;%if because of the Range the probability is less than 
0 it is assigned 0 
end 
end 
end 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
a = MFTProbmode-MFTRange; 
b = MFTProbmode+MFTRange; 
c = MFTProbmode; 
u = rand(runs,1);%selects random numbers 
for n=1:runs 
if (u(n)<((c(n)-a(n))/(b(n)-a(n)))); 
MFTProb(n)= a(n) + sqrt(u(n)*((b(n)-a(n))*(c(n)-a(n)))); 
if MFTProb(n)>1 
    MFTProb(n)=1;%if because of the Range the probability is greater 
than 1 it is assigned 1 
end 
if MFTProb(n)<0 
    MFTProb(n)=0;%if because of the Range the probability is less than 
0 it is assigned 0 
end 
else 
MFTProb(n) = b(n) - sqrt((1-u(n))*(b(n)-a(n))*(b(n)-c(n))); 
if MFTProb(n)>1 
    MFTProb(n)=1;%if because of the Range the probability is greater 
than 1 it is assigned 1 
end 
if MFTProb(n)<0 
    MFTProb(n)=0;%if because of the Range the probability is less than 
0 it is assigned 0 
end 
end 
end 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
a = FDTProbmode-FDTRange; 
b = FDTProbmode+FDTRange; 
c = FDTProbmode; 
u = rand(runs,1);%selects random numbers 
for n=1:runs 
if (u(n)<((c(n)-a(n))/(b(n)-a(n)))); 
FDTProb(n)= a(n) + sqrt(u(n)*((b(n)-a(n))*(c(n)-a(n)))); 
if FDTProb(n)>1 
    FDTProb(n)=1;%if because of the Range the probability is greater 
than 1 it is assigned 1 
end 
if FDTProb(n)<0 
    FDTProb(n)=0;%if because of the Range the probability is less than 
0 it is assigned 0 
end 
else 
FDTProb(n) = b(n) - sqrt((1-u(n))*(b(n)-a(n))*(b(n)-c(n))); 
if FDTProb(n)>1 
    FDTProb(n)=1;%if because of the Range the probability is greater 
than 1 it is assigned 1 
end 
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if FDTProb(n)<0 
    FDTProb(n)=0;%if because of the Range the probability is less than 
0 it is assigned 0 
end 
end 
end 
  
%This next block takes all of the probabilities found in the last 
section 
%and multiplies them to find the overall probability 
for n=1:runs 
    totalprob(n)=GenMissProb(n)*((obMatProb(n)*Acquire_mat)+(1-
Acquire_mat))*UFTProb(n)*GFTProb(n)*MFTProb(n)*FDTProb(n); 
end 
hist(totalprob,100)%displays the final probability 
xlabel('Probability of Success','FontSize',12)%label for histogram 
ylabel('Frequency probability was computed','FontSize',12)%label for 
histogram 
title('Overall Probability of Success 
Distribution','FontSize',16)%title for histogram 
%Written by Peter Mastro 30 January 2009  
%This program finds the sensitivity of the overall probability to 
changes 
%in each of the nodes 
SurgReq=lowest_req; %sets the surge required to the lowest value it can 
take on 
ReadyRes=most_redres; 
RetiredRes=most_retres; 
  
%Finds the percent surge filled 
if (SurgReq<=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)) 
    filled=1; 
else 
    filled=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)/SurgReq; 
end 
  
ForceProt=1; 
  
GenMissionSens=GenMissB(1)+GenMissB(2)*ForceProt+GenMissB(3)*filled; 
ObtainMatSens=ob_MatB(1)+ob_MatB(2)*ForceProt+ob_MatB(3)*filled; 
UFTSens=UFTB(1)+UFTB(2)*ForceProt+UFTB(3)*filled; 
GFTSens=GFTB(1)+GFTB(2)*ForceProt+GFTB(3)*filled; 
MFTSens=MFTB(1)+MFTB(2)*ForceProt+MFTB(3)*filled; 
FDTSens=FDTB(1)+FDTB(2)*ForceProt+FDTB(3)*filled; 
SurgeLowtotal=GenMissionSens*((Acquire_mat*ObtainMatSens)+(1-
Acquire_mat))*UFTSens*GFTSens*MFTSens*FDTSens; %Finds the overall 
probability based on the lowest surge required 
disp('The overall probability of success when the Surge is at its 
lowest is') 
disp(SurgeLowtotal) 
  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
SurgReq=highest_req;%sets surge required to the most it can be 
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ReadyRes=most_redres; 
RetiredRes=most_retres; 
  
%calculates percent surge filled 
if (SurgReq<=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)) 
    filled=1; 
else 
    filled=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)/SurgReq; 
end 
  
ForceProt=1; 
  
GenMissionSens=GenMissB(1)+GenMissB(2)*ForceProt+GenMissB(3)*filled; 
ObtainMatSens=ob_MatB(1)+ob_MatB(2)*ForceProt+ob_MatB(3)*filled; 
UFTSens=UFTB(1)+UFTB(2)*ForceProt+UFTB(3)*filled; 
GFTSens=GFTB(1)+GFTB(2)*ForceProt+GFTB(3)*filled; 
MFTSens=MFTB(1)+MFTB(2)*ForceProt+MFTB(3)*filled; 
FDTSens=FDTB(1)+FDTB(2)*ForceProt+FDTB(3)*filled; 
SurgeHightotal=GenMissionSens*((Acquire_mat*ObtainMatSens)+(1-
Acquire_mat))*UFTSens*GFTSens*MFTSens*FDTSens; %finds overall 
probability based on the highest surge value 
disp('The overall probability of success when the Surge is at its 
highest is') 
disp(SurgeHightotal) 
SurgeSensdiff=abs(SurgeHightotal-SurgeLowtotal);%computes the 
difference between the two extremes of the surge 
disp('The probability difference is') 
disp(SurgeSensdiff) 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
SurgReq=most_req; 
ReadyRes=lowest_redres; %sets the Ready Reserve to the lowest value it 
can attain 
RetiredRes=most_retres; 
  
%Finds the percent surge filled 
if (SurgReq<=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)) 
    filled=1; 
else 
    filled=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)/SurgReq; 
end 
  
ForceProt=1; 
  
GenMissionSens=GenMissB(1)+GenMissB(2)*ForceProt+GenMissB(3)*filled; 
ObtainMatSens=ob_MatB(1)+ob_MatB(2)*ForceProt+ob_MatB(3)*filled; 
UFTSens=UFTB(1)+UFTB(2)*ForceProt+UFTB(3)*filled; 
GFTSens=GFTB(1)+GFTB(2)*ForceProt+GFTB(3)*filled; 
MFTSens=MFTB(1)+MFTB(2)*ForceProt+MFTB(3)*filled; 
FDTSens=FDTB(1)+FDTB(2)*ForceProt+FDTB(3)*filled; 
ReadyLowtotal=GenMissionSens*((Acquire_mat*ObtainMatSens)+(1-
Acquire_mat))*UFTSens*GFTSens*MFTSens*FDTSens; %calculates the overall 
probability based on the low Ready Reserve number 
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disp('The overall probability of success when the Ready Reserve is at 
its lowest is') 
disp(ReadyLowtotal) 
  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
SurgReq=most_req; 
ReadyRes=highest_redres; 
RetiredRes=most_retres; 
  
%Finds the percent surge filled 
if (SurgReq<=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)) 
    filled=1; 
else 
    filled=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)/SurgReq; 
end 
  
ForceProt=1; 
  
GenMissionSens=GenMissB(1)+GenMissB(2)*ForceProt+GenMissB(3)*filled; 
ObtainMatSens=ob_MatB(1)+ob_MatB(2)*ForceProt+ob_MatB(3)*filled; 
UFTSens=UFTB(1)+UFTB(2)*ForceProt+UFTB(3)*filled; 
GFTSens=GFTB(1)+GFTB(2)*ForceProt+GFTB(3)*filled; 
MFTSens=MFTB(1)+MFTB(2)*ForceProt+MFTB(3)*filled; 
FDTSens=FDTB(1)+FDTB(2)*ForceProt+FDTB(3)*filled; 
ReadyHightotal=GenMissionSens*((Acquire_mat*ObtainMatSens)+(1-
Acquire_mat))*UFTSens*GFTSens*MFTSens*FDTSens;%calculates the overall 
probability based on the high Ready Reserve number 
disp('The overall probability of success when the Ready Reserve is at 
its highest is') 
disp(ReadyHightotal) 
ReadySensdiff=abs(ReadyHightotal-ReadyLowtotal);%computes the 
difference between the two extremes of the Ready Reserve 
disp('The probability difference is') 
disp(ReadySensdiff) 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
SurgReq=most_req; 
ReadyRes=most_redres; 
RetiredRes=lowest_retres; %Sets the Retired Reserve to the lowest it 
can attain 
  
%Finds the percent surge filled 
if (SurgReq<=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)) 
    filled=1; 
else 
    filled=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)/SurgReq; 
end 
  
ForceProt=1; 
  
GenMissionSens=GenMissB(1)+GenMissB(2)*ForceProt+GenMissB(3)*filled; 
ObtainMatSens=ob_MatB(1)+ob_MatB(2)*ForceProt+ob_MatB(3)*filled; 
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UFTSens=UFTB(1)+UFTB(2)*ForceProt+UFTB(3)*filled; 
GFTSens=GFTB(1)+GFTB(2)*ForceProt+GFTB(3)*filled; 
MFTSens=MFTB(1)+MFTB(2)*ForceProt+MFTB(3)*filled; 
FDTSens=FDTB(1)+FDTB(2)*ForceProt+FDTB(3)*filled; 
RetiredLowtotal=GenMissionSens*((Acquire_mat*ObtainMatSens)+(1-
Acquire_mat))*UFTSens*GFTSens*MFTSens*FDTSens; 
disp('The overall probability of success when the Retired Reserve is at 
its lowest is') 
disp(RetiredLowtotal) 
  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
SurgReq=most_req; 
ReadyRes=most_redres; 
RetiredRes=highest_retres;%sets the Retired Reserve to the highest it 
can attain 
  
%Finds the percent surge filled 
if (SurgReq<=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)) 
    filled=1; 
else 
    filled=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)/SurgReq; 
end 
  
ForceProt=1; 
  
GenMissionSens=GenMissB(1)+GenMissB(2)*ForceProt+GenMissB(3)*filled; 
ObtainMatSens=ob_MatB(1)+ob_MatB(2)*ForceProt+ob_MatB(3)*filled; 
UFTSens=UFTB(1)+UFTB(2)*ForceProt+UFTB(3)*filled; 
GFTSens=GFTB(1)+GFTB(2)*ForceProt+GFTB(3)*filled; 
MFTSens=MFTB(1)+MFTB(2)*ForceProt+MFTB(3)*filled; 
FDTSens=FDTB(1)+FDTB(2)*ForceProt+FDTB(3)*filled; 
RetiredHightotal=GenMissionSens*((Acquire_mat*ObtainMatSens)+(1-
Acquire_mat))*UFTSens*GFTSens*MFTSens*FDTSens; 
disp('The overall probability of success when the Retired Reserve is at 
its highest is') 
disp(RetiredHightotal) 
RetiredSensdiff=abs(RetiredHightotal-RetiredLowtotal);%computes the 
difference between the two extremes of the Retired Reserve 
disp('The probability difference is') 
disp(RetiredSensdiff) 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%These next blocks determine the effect that the Force Protection has 
SurgReq=most_req;  
ReadyRes=most_redres; 
RetiredRes=most_retres; 
  
%Finds the percent surge filled 
if (SurgReq<=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)) 
    filled=1; 
else 
    filled=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)/SurgReq; 
end 
  
 100 
ForceProt=1; 
  
GenMissionSens=GenMissB(1)+GenMissB(2)*ForceProt+GenMissB(3)*filled; 
ObtainMatSens=ob_MatB(1)+ob_MatB(2)*ForceProt+ob_MatB(3)*filled; 
UFTSens=UFTB(1)+UFTB(2)*ForceProt+UFTB(3)*filled; 
GFTSens=GFTB(1)+GFTB(2)*ForceProt+GFTB(3)*filled; 
MFTSens=MFTB(1)+MFTB(2)*ForceProt+MFTB(3)*filled; 
FDTSens=FDTB(1)+FDTB(2)*ForceProt+FDTB(3)*filled; 
FPCONLow=GenMissionSens*((Acquire_mat*ObtainMatSens)+(1-
Acquire_mat))*UFTSens*GFTSens*MFTSens*FDTSens; %Finds the overall 
probability based on FPCON Alpha 
disp('The overall probability of success when the FPCON is Alpha is') 
disp(FPCONLow) 
  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
SurgReq=most_req;%sets surge required to the most it can be 
ReadyRes=most_redres; 
RetiredRes=most_retres; 
  
%calculates percent surge filled 
if (SurgReq<=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)) 
    filled=1; 
else 
    filled=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)/SurgReq; 
end 
  
ForceProt=4; 
  
GenMissionSens=GenMissB(1)+GenMissB(2)*ForceProt+GenMissB(3)*filled; 
ObtainMatSens=ob_MatB(1)+ob_MatB(2)*ForceProt+ob_MatB(3)*filled; 
UFTSens=UFTB(1)+UFTB(2)*ForceProt+UFTB(3)*filled; 
GFTSens=GFTB(1)+GFTB(2)*ForceProt+GFTB(3)*filled; 
MFTSens=MFTB(1)+MFTB(2)*ForceProt+MFTB(3)*filled; 
FDTSens=FDTB(1)+FDTB(2)*ForceProt+FDTB(3)*filled; 
FPCONHigh=GenMissionSens*((Acquire_mat*ObtainMatSens)+(1-
Acquire_mat))*UFTSens*GFTSens*MFTSens*FDTSens; %finds overall 
probability based on the highest surge value 
disp('The overall probability of success when the FPCON is Delta is') 
disp(FPCONHigh) 
FPCONdiff=abs(FPCONLow-FPCONHigh);%computes the difference between the 
two extremes of the FPCON 
disp('The probability difference is') 
disp(FPCONdiff) 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%The next two blocks turn "on" and "off" the obtain Material node to 
determine 
%the effect of having it on and off 
SurgReq=most_req; 
ReadyRes=most_redres; 
RetiredRes=most_retres; 
  
%Finds the percent surge filled 
if (SurgReq<=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)) 
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    filled=1; 
else 
    filled=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)/SurgReq; 
end 
  
ForceProt=1; 
  
GenMissionSens=GenMissB(1)+GenMissB(2)*ForceProt+GenMissB(3)*filled; 
ObtainMatSens=ob_MatB(1)+ob_MatB(2)*ForceProt+ob_MatB(3)*filled; 
UFTSens=UFTB(1)+UFTB(2)*ForceProt+UFTB(3)*filled; 
GFTSens=GFTB(1)+GFTB(2)*ForceProt+GFTB(3)*filled; 
MFTSens=MFTB(1)+MFTB(2)*ForceProt+MFTB(3)*filled; 
FDTSens=FDTB(1)+FDTB(2)*ForceProt+FDTB(3)*filled; 
AcqMattotal=GenMissionSens*ObtainMatSens*UFTSens*GFTSens*MFTSens*FDTSen
s;%finds overall probability based on needing to accomplish the obtain 
Material node 
disp('The overall probability of success when it is required to Acquire 
Material is') 
disp(AcqMattotal) 
  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
SurgReq=most_req; 
ReadyRes=most_redres; 
RetiredRes=most_retres; 
  
%Finds the percent surge filled 
if (SurgReq<=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)) 
    filled=1; 
else 
    filled=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)/SurgReq; 
end 
  
ForceProt=1; 
  
GenMissionSens=GenMissB(1)+GenMissB(2)*ForceProt+GenMissB(3)*filled; 
ObtainMatSens=ob_MatB(1)+ob_MatB(2)*ForceProt+ob_MatB(3)*filled; 
UFTSens=UFTB(1)+UFTB(2)*ForceProt+UFTB(3)*filled; 
GFTSens=GFTB(1)+GFTB(2)*ForceProt+GFTB(3)*filled; 
MFTSens=MFTB(1)+MFTB(2)*ForceProt+MFTB(3)*filled; 
FDTSens=FDTB(1)+FDTB(2)*ForceProt+FDTB(3)*filled; 
NotAcqMattotal=GenMissionSens*UFTSens*GFTSens*MFTSens*FDTSens;%finds 
overall probability based on not needing to accomplish the obtain 
Material node 
disp('The overall probability of success when not required to Acquire 
Material is') 
disp(NotAcqMattotal) 
AcqMatsensdiff=abs(NotAcqMattotal-AcqMattotal);%computes the difference 
between needing to obtain materials and not needing to 
disp('The probability difference is') 
disp(AcqMatsensdiff) 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
SurgReq=most_req; 
ReadyRes=most_redres; 
RetiredRes=most_retres; 
  
%Finds the percent surge filled 
if (SurgReq<=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)) 
    filled=1; 
else 
    filled=(ReadyRes+RetiredRes)/SurgReq; 
end 
  
ForceProt=1; 
  
%The following block finds the overall probability of success when each 
node takes 
%on its mode value and the overall probability of success when each 
node takes on 
%the value half way between its mode and 1.  Only one node is moved at 
a 
%time to see its affect on the overall probability of success. 
GenMissionSens=GenMissB(1)+GenMissB(2)*ForceProt+GenMissB(3)*filled; 
GenMissionSensHigh=((1-GenMissionSens)/2)+GenMissionSens; 
ObtainMatSens=ob_MatB(1)+ob_MatB(2)*ForceProt+ob_MatB(3)*filled; 
ObtainMatSensHigh=((1-ObtainMatSens)/2)+ObtainMatSens; 
UFTSens=UFTB(1)+UFTB(2)*ForceProt+UFTB(3)*filled; 
UFTSensHigh=((1-UFTSens)/2)+UFTSens; 
GFTSens=GFTB(1)+GFTB(2)*ForceProt+GFTB(3)*filled; 
GFTSensHigh=((1-GFTSens)/2)+GFTSens; 
MFTSens=MFTB(1)+MFTB(2)*ForceProt+MFTB(3)*filled; 
MFTSensHigh=((1-MFTSens)/2)+MFTSens; 
FDTSens=FDTB(1)+FDTB(2)*ForceProt+FDTB(3)*filled; 
FDTSensHigh=((1-FDTSens)/2)+FDTSens; 
  
  
%This block finds the difference between the two probability of success 
found for each node above to determine the impact each node has on 
%the overall probability of success. 
GenMissiondiff=((Acquire_mat*ObtainMatSens)+(1-
Acquire_mat))*UFTSens*GFTSens*MFTSens*FDTSens*(GenMissionSensHigh-
GenMissionSens); 
ObtainMatdiff=GenMissionSens*UFTSens*GFTSens*MFTSens*FDTSens*((Acquire_
mat*ObtainMatSensHigh+(1-Acquire_mat))-(Acquire_mat*ObtainMatSens+(1-
Acquire_mat))); 
UFTdiff=((Acquire_mat*ObtainMatSens)+(1-
Acquire_mat))*GFTSens*MFTSens*FDTSens*GenMissionSens*(UFTSensHigh-
UFTSens); 
GFTdiff=((Acquire_mat*ObtainMatSens)+(1-
Acquire_mat))*MFTSens*FDTSens*GenMissionSens*UFTSens*(GFTSensHigh-
GFTSens); 
MFTdiff=((Acquire_mat*ObtainMatSens)+(1-
Acquire_mat))*FDTSens*GenMissionSens*UFTSens*GFTSens*(MFTSensHigh-
MFTSens); 
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FDTdiff=((Acquire_mat*ObtainMatSens)+(1-
Acquire_mat))*GenMissionSens*UFTSens*GFTSens*MFTSens*(FDTSensHigh-
FDTSens); 
  
disp('The probability difference for Generate the Mission is') 
disp(GenMissiondiff) 
disp('The probability difference for Obtain Materials is') 
disp(ObtainMatdiff) 
disp('The probability difference for Undergraduate Flying Training is') 
disp(UFTdiff) 
disp('The probability difference for Graduate Flying Training is') 
disp(GFTdiff) 
disp('The probability difference for Mission Flying Training is') 
disp(MFTdiff) 
disp('The probability difference for Flying Deployment Training is') 
disp(FDTdiff) 
  
%Displays the results to a bar graph so the user can see which node is 
most 
%controlling. 
sensmatrix=[SurgeSensdiff,ReadySensdiff,RetiredSensdiff,FPCONdiff,AcqMa
tsensdiff,GenMissiondiff,ObtainMatdiff,UFTdiff,GFTdiff,MFTdiff,FDTdiff]
; 
x=[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11]; 
bar(x,sensmatrix) 
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Appendix C.  Example Data Input 
 
Identify Surge Requirements 
Given the scenario what is the lowest likely number of surge 
personnel required? 
20 
Given the scenario what is the most likely number of surge 
personnel required? 
60 
Given the scenario what is the largest likely number of surge 
personnel required? 
80 
Recall Ready Reserve 
Given the scenario, what is the lower limit on the expected 
number of Ready Reserve the can be recalled? 
0 
Given the scenario, what is the expected number of Ready 
Reserve the can be recalled? 
30 
Given the scenario, what is the upper limit on the expected 
number of Ready Reserve the can be recalled? 
40 
Recall Standby/Retired Reserve 
Given the scenario, what is the lower limit on the expected 
number of Standby/Retired Reserve the can be recalled? 
0 
Given the scenario, what is the expected number of 
Standby/Retired Reserve the can be recalled? 
2 
Given the scenario, what is the upper limit on the expected 
number of Standby/Retired Reserve the can be recalled? 
5 
Force Protection Condition 
Given the scenario what is the probability the base is at FPCON 
ALPHA(1)? 
0.40 
Given the scenario what is the probability the base is at FPCON 
BRAVO(2)? 
0.30 
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Given the scenario what is the probability the base is at FPCON 
CHARLIE(3)? 
0.20 
Given the scenario what is the probability the base is at FPCON 
DELTA(4)? 
0.10 
  Sum must equal 1.00: 1.00 
Acquire Materiel? 
Given the scenario, how likely is it that additional training 
materials will be required? 
0.90 
Generate Training Mission 
What is the probability of Successfully completing 'Generate Training 
Mission' based on the FPCON and % surge filled provided? 
FPCON % surge filled P(Success) "+/-" 
ALPHA(1) 100 0.96 0.03 
ALPHA(1) 0 0.65   
DELTA(4) 0 0.7   
Obtain Training Material 
What is the probability of Successfully completing 'Obtain Training 
Material' based on the FPCON and % surge filled provided? 
FPCON % surge filled P(Success) "+/-" 
ALPHA(1) 100 1 0.03 
ALPHA(1) 0 0.85   
DELTA(4) 0 0.6   
Undergraduate Flying Training 
What is the probability of Successfully completing 'Undergraduate 
Flying Training' based on the FPCON and % surge filled provided? 
FPCON % surge filled P(Success) "+/-" 
ALPHA(1) 100 0.98 0.03 
ALPHA(1) 0 0.6   
DELTA(4) 0 0.5   
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Graduate Flying Training 
What is the probability of Successfully completing 'Graduate Flying 
Training' based on the FPCON and % surge filled provided? 
FPCON % surge filled P(Success) "+/-" 
ALPHA(1) 100 0.98 0.03 
ALPHA(1) 0 0.6   
DELTA(4) 0 0.5   
   
Mission Flying Training 
What is the probability of Successfully completing 'Mission Flying 
Training' based on the FPCON and % surge filled provided? 
FPCON % surge filled P(Success) "+/-" 
ALPHA(1) 100 0.99 0.03 
ALPHA(1) 0 0.7   
DELTA(4) 0 0.6   
Flying Deployment Training 
What is the probability of Successfully completing 'Flying Deployment 
Training' based on the FPCON and % surge filled provided? 
FPCON % surge filled P(Success) "+/-" 
ALPHA(1) 100 0.99 0.03 
ALPHA(1) 0 0.75   
DELTA(4) 0 0.65   
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Appendix D.  Acronyms 
 
ACS Agile Combat Support 
AcV Acquisition Viewpoint 
AD Active Duty 
AF Air Force 
AFI Air Force Instruction 
AFPD Air Force Policy Directive 
ARC Air Reserve Component 
AV All View(point) 
C4ISR Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, 
Reconnaissance 
CADM Core Architecture Data Model 
CBA Capability Based Assessment 
CBAM Capability Based Assessment Methodology 
CBP Capability Based Planning  
CCA Clinger-Cohen Act 
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
COCOM Combatant Commander 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
CRRA Capability Review and Risk Assessment 
CSAF Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force 
CV Capability Viewpoint 
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DIV Data and Information Viewpoint 
DM2 DoDAF Meta-Model 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoDAF Department of Defense Architecture Framework 
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, 
Personnel, and Facilities 
FAA Functional Area Analysis 
FDT  Flying Deployment Training 
FFBD Functional Flow Block Diagram 
FNA Functional Needs Analysis 
FSA Functional Solutions Analysis 
GE Good Enough Value  
GFT Graduate Flying Training 
ICOM Input Control Output Mechanism 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IPL Integrated Priority List 
ISO International Standards Organization 
JCA Joint Capability Area 
JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
JIC Joint Integrating Concept 
JOC Joint Operating Concept 
JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
LMV Limited Military Value 
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MAJCOM Major Command 
MCL Master Capability Library 
MFT Mission Flying Training 
MODAF Ministry of Defense Architecture Framework 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
OV Operational View(point) 
PAAR Potential Area to Accept Risk 
POM Program Objective Memorandum 
PPBE Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution 
PSM Process Sequence Model 
PV Project Viewpoint 
RGS Requirements Generation System 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SMP Strategic Master Plan 
SOV Service Oriented Viewpoint 
StdV Standards Viewpoint 
StV Strategic Viewpoint 
SvcV Service Viewpoint 
SV Systems View(point) 
TOGAF The Open Group Architecture Framework 
TV Technical View 
UFT Undergraduate Flying Training 
UML Unified Modeling Language  
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